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THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
ACCURACY OF BREATH TEST 
RESULTS UNDER ALASKA LAW 
PAUL A. CLARK 
ABSTRACT 
Section 28.90.020 of the Alaska Statutes provides that in prosecutions for 
drunk driving, “if an offense described under this title requires that a 
chemical test of a person’s breath produce a particular result, and the 
chemical test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument approved by 
the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute is not affected 
by the instrument’s working tolerance.” This provision appears to prohibit 
the defense from calling into question the accuracy of a breath test by 
introducing evidence of uncertainty inherent in the testing procedure. The 
statute is problematic because due process requires that defendants be 
permitted to challenge the evidence presented against them. Moreover, there 
is a strong argument that basing conviction on a single breath sample that is 
within a known margin of error is a per se violation of due process, as it bases 
guilt or innocence on a purely fortuitous result. This Article examines the 
issues with Alaska’s statute and proposes using multiple breath tests as a 
simple, cost-effective solution to this potential abuse of due process. 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical trial testimony by a properly 
qualified expert witness in a drunk-driving case. The uncontested 
evidence which has been presented from video surveillance in the bar 
where the defendant was drinking and the testimony of the bar tender 
and twenty witnesses prove that she drank exactly four bottles of 
Alaskan Amber beer. Based on the defendant’s size and the quantity of 
alcohol, her blood alcohol level could not possibly have been higher 
than .070 percent. Even though her breath test sample result was an 
apparent .080, due to the inherent uncertainty in such testing, the 
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apparent result is within the margin of error for the instrument used, 
and does not contradict a legal blood or breath alcohol level. 
Unfortunately for our hypothetical defendant, this defense may not 
be allowed. While Alaska’s driving under the influence (“DUI”) statute 
says that defendants may introduce evidence of the amount of alcohol 
consumed in order to rebut the apparent results of the breath sample,1 
section 28.90.020 of the Alaska Statutes (the “working tolerance” statute) 
ostensibly prevents defendants from introducing evidence of inherent 
uncertainty in the breath testing procedure.2 Accordingly, our 
hypothetical defendant could present evidence that she drank only four 
beers and that she could not have been higher than .070, but could not 
present the explanation reconciling the discrepancy: namely, that an 
apparent result of .080 actually represents a range of possible breath 
alcohol levels. 
This paper argues that the Alaska and United States Constitutions 
guarantee a criminal defendant the right to introduce exculpatory 
evidence, and therefore a defendant cannot be prevented by statute from 
presenting a defense based on the margin of error.3 As one leading 
scholar has summarized it, “The Court has rigorously enforced the 
accused’s constitutional right and strictly scrutinized exclusionary rules 
that block the admission of important defense evidence.”4 Moreover, 
due process likely requires that known uncertainties in the measuring 
process be assumed in favor of a criminal defendant. 
Alaska courts have generally held statutes unconstitutional when 
 
 1.  See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(s) (2012) (“In a prosecution under (a) of this 
section, a person may introduce evidence on the amount of alcohol consumed 
before or after operating or driving the motor vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft to 
rebut or explain the results of a chemical test.”). 
 2.  See ALASKA STAT. § 28.90.020(a) (2012) (“[I]f an offense described under 
this title requires that a chemical test of a person's breath produce a particular 
result, and the chemical test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument 
approved by the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute is 
not affected by the instrument's working tolerance.”). The terms “margin of 
error,” “working tolerance,” and “inherent uncertainty” are used 
interchangeably by the courts. 
 3.  Valentine v. State, 215 P.3d 319, 325 (Alaska 2009) (“Under the United 
States and Alaska Constitutions, a defendant has the right to present relevant 
exculpatory evidence in a criminal trial.”); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 
U.S. 319, 324 (2006) ("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses 
of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”) (quoting Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a 
complete discussion of the parameters of this right, see infra Section VII. 
 4.  EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & NORMAN M. GARLAND, EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE: THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT FAVORABLE 
EVIDENCE 79 (3d. ed. 2004). 
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they restrict a defendant’s ability to present a defense.5 For example, in 
State v. Murtagh,6 the Alaska Supreme Court considered the validity of a 
statute that placed a variety of restrictions on criminal defendants 
seeking to interview witnesses in sexual offense cases (while not placing 
the same restrictions on the prosecution).7 Statements taken without 
following these procedures were presumptively inadmissible.8 The court 
held these provisions to be unconstitutional violations of due process.9 
The court went on to note that “the court’s responsibility concerning fair 
trial rights does not mean that the legislature is powerless to act in the 
area. But our responsibility requires that statutes that are claimed to 
infringe fair trial rights be closely scrutinized.”10 
Furthermore, “conclusive presumptions” are forbidden in criminal 
cases.11 “Permissive presumptions” are permitted so long as the jury is 
informed that it may but need not conclude that proof of one fact 
establishes the proof of the second fact, and that such a “permissive 
inference” in no way relieves the state of the burden to prove each 
element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.12 Whatever the 
“working tolerance” statute may mean, however, it cannot establish a 
conclusive presumption, nor can it shift the burden of proof to a 
defendant with respect to an element of the offense. 
I. DEFINING THE CRIME OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
In Alaska it is a crime to knowingly operate a vehicle with a breath 
alcohol level of at least .080 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, or a 
blood alcohol level of .08% or more.13 Under the “blood-alcohol-level 
theory” of drunk driving (sometimes referred to as the per se theory), 
the state can convict a person of drunk driving regardless of actual 
impairment as long as it has chemical tests proving excessive blood or 
breath alcohol content.14 In addition to the per se theory, a person can be 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Valentine, 215 P.3d at 325 (holding that excluding “delayed-
absorption evidence in prosecutions . . . that rely on chemical test results violates 
the defendant's right to due process”). 
 6.  169 P.3d 602 (Alaska 2007). 
 7.  Id. at 605. 
 8.  Id. at 606. 
 9.  Id. at 624. 
 10.  Id. at 609. 
 11.  Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523–24 (1979). 
 12. Id. at 524 (“Because [defendant’s] jury may have interpreted the judge’s 
instruction as constituting either a burden-shifting presumption . . . or a 
conclusive presumption . . . we hold the instruction given in this case 
unconstitutional.”). 
 13.  ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(2) (2012). 
 14.  Valentine v. State, 215 P.3d 319, 319 (Alaska 2009). This is referred to as 
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convicted under the “impairment theory,” under which the state can 
show impairment of driving ability.15 
The phrase “as determined by a chemical test,” which is typically 
lifted and placed in a jury instruction,16 is confusing to many jurors (and 
perhaps even to some courts). For example, in City of Seattle v. Gellein,17 a 
Washington trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution had to 
prove that the defendant was driving and that “at the time he had 0.10 
percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by chemical 
analysis of his breath.”18 The jury was unsure what to make of this 
language and sent a note to the judge asking: “Are we to believe that the 
breathalyzer test is infallible and accurate? So, if the breathalyzer is .16 
then the defendant is guilty because the defendant is driving while he 
has over .10 percent in his blood stream.”19 The judge gave no clarifying 
instruction, and the jury found the defendant guilty.20 The Washington 
Supreme Court overturned the verdict because the jury may have 
understood the instruction to require them to accept the apparent breath 
test result as accurate.21 
In fact, there are many reasons that a breathalyzer reading may be 
inaccurate, including equipment malfunction or operator error. In June 
of 2010, The Washington Post reported that hundreds of defendants in the 
District of Columbia were wrongfully convicted of DUI because “[t]he 
District’s badly calibrated equipment would show a driver’s blood-
alcohol content to be about 20 percent higher than it actually was.”22 
 
the “blood-alcohol-level theory” even when it is usually breath alcohol that is 
tested. Id. 
 15.   ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(1) (2012). See Conrad v. State, 54 P.3d 313 
(noting that defendant was tried under the “impairment theory,” which is 
codified in ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(1)). 
 16. See CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMITTEE, ALASKA CRIMINAL 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2012), available at http://www.courts.alaska.gov/ 
crimins.htm (giving examples of jury instructions). 
 17.  768 P.2d 470 (Wash. 1989) (en banc). 
 18.  Id. at 470. This is the language of WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502 (1981), 
which provided that a person was guilty of drunk driving if he drove while 
“[h]e ha[d] a 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by 
chemical analysis of this breath, blood, or other bodily substance.” 
 19.  Id. at 471. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See id. at 472 (holding that the instruction was “susceptible to 
misinterpretation by a reasonable jury as an unconstitutional mandatory 
presumption”). 
 22.  Mary Pat Flaherty, 400 Drunken-Driving Convictions in D.C. Based on 
Flawed Test, Official Says, THE WASH. POST (June 10, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/ 
AR2010060906257.html. In March 2011, the Philadelphia Inquirer discovered the 
same problem. See Dana Difilippo, City Fails Breathalyzer Test in 1,100 Cases, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 24, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-03-
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Even when a breathalyzer is properly calibrated, the subject sample 
may not accurately reflect the person’s level of sobriety. Most states 
require two breath samples,23 and it is common for a person to blow into 
the breathalyzer twice and obtain one result above .08 and another result 
below .08.24 
These deviations are well-known in the scientific literature on 
breath testing.25 But two states (Alaska and Delaware) have statutes that 
appear to forbid introduction of margin of error evidence.26 For years, 
Alaska law required that any inherent uncertainty in the breath or blood 
reading be applied in favor of the defendant,27 but in 1996 the legislature 
passed a statute declaring that margin of error evidence in blood-alcohol 
theory cases was inadmissible.28 The court of appeals in Mangiapane v. 
Municipality of Anchorage29 then held that this statute “effectively 
declares that a driver violates AS 28.35.030(a)(2) if . . . the driver’s test 
result is at least .10 percent blood-alcohol or the equivalent .10 grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath.”30 In other words, the test result itself 
was the element of the offense rather than evidence of the offense. The 
accuracy of the test seems to become irrelevant under this theory. 
Within three years, the court of appeals reversed course and 
clarified that the test only created a presumption of blood or breath 
alcohol content at the time of offense, and was not itself the element that 
needed to be proved.31 However, Alaska courts have not gone back to 
 
24/news/29181749_1_dui-cases-breathalyzer-machines-hundreds-of-drunk-
drivers (finding that four breathalyzer machines were improperly calibrated). 
 23.  See infra Section VIII. 
 24.  See, e.g., State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v. Taylor-Caldwell, 229 P.3d 471, 
471 (Nev. 2010) (registering consecutive breath tests at 0.073 and 0.083); Jaffray v. 
State, 702 S.E.2d 742, 744 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (registering both a 0.085 and a 
0.073); Gillham v. County of Lake, No. A124084, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
4351, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (registering three tests, the first negative, the 
second .08, and the third .07). 
 25.  See generally R.G. Gullberg, Duplicate Breath Testing: Some Statistical 
Analyses, 36 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 205 (1988) (encouraging duplicate breath testing 
to increase sample size and improve accuracy). 
 26.  ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177 (2012) 
(“In any proceeding, the resulting alcohol or drug concentration when a test, as 
defined in subsection (c)(2) of this section, is performed shall be deemed to be 
the actual alcohol or drug concentration in the person’s blood breath or urine 
without regard to any margin of error or tolerance factor inherent in such 
tests.”). 
 27.  Barcott v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 741 P.2d 
226, 228 (Alaska 1987) (“[D]ue process requires consideration of the margin of 
error inherent in the breath testing procedure . . . .”). 
 28.  ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a) (1997). 
 29.  974 P.2d 427 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). 
 30. Id. at 430. 
 31.  Conrad v. State, 54 P.3d 313, 314–15 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (“We find no 
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the requirement that uncertainty must be assumed to benefit the 
defendant. A defendant cannot challenge the accuracy of the test “as 
long as a breath test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument 
approved by the Department of Public Safety.”32 
This line of cases has resulted in considerable confusion as to the 
elements of DUI. This Article argues that a breath test result should be 
evidence of a person’s breath alcohol concentration rather than an element 
of the offense. The court of appeals in Mangiapane held that a positive 
test result was an element of the offense,33 but succeeding cases have 
distinguished Mangiapane‘s holding.34 Alaska’s courts should recognize 
that due process permits a defendant to introduce evidence that the 
breath test is inaccurate, and any margin of error must be credited to a 
criminal defendant. 
II. THE TESTING PROCEDURE: WHY IS THERE UNCERTAINTY? 
The breathalyzer measures the amount of alcohol in the breath.  
The test results reported by the breathalyzer corresponds to blood-
alcohol percentages by assuming a blood-alcohol to breath-alcohol ratio 
of 2100 to 1.35 When alcohol passes into the lungs through the 
bloodstream, it mixes with the inhaled air in the alveoli.36 The scientific 
validity of a breathalyzer test result depends on testing this alveolar 
breath.37 
The Alaska Court of Appeals addressed the scientific validity of the 
test by holding that a “breathalyzer result was presumptively admissible 
if the municipality established, as a foundational matter, that the 
analysis of [the defendant’s] breath was performed according to 
methods approved by the Alaska Department of Health and Social 
Services.”38 However, the presumption of admissibility is not 
 
indication that the Alaska Legislature . . . intended to shift the focus away from 
the defendant’s blood alcohol level at the time of driving and to make the test 
result determinative of the defendant’s guilt.”), superseded by statute, Act effective 
July 1, 2004, §§ 25, 27, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 124, as recognized in Valentine 
v. State, 215 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2009). 
 32.  Hooton v. State, No. A–9435, 2009 WL 1259360, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. 
May 6, 2009). 
 33.  974 P.2d at 430 (basing violation on test result, not “true” blood alcohol 
level). 
 34.  See infra Section VI. 
 35.  Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376, 378 (Alaska 1976). 
 36.  State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 127 (N.J. 2008). 
 37.  See id. (“Breath testing therefore uses an indirect measure of BAC by 
calculating the alcohol concentration in the breath . . . .”). 
 38.  Thayer v. Municipality of Anchorage, 686 P.2d 721, 726 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1984). 
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irrebuttable, and the court must ask whether the procedures for testing 
breath comply with the manufacturer’s specifications for proper use.39 
The case of Guerre-Chaley v. State40 is a good illustration of this 
point. When he was arrested, Guerre-Chaley was given a preliminary 
breath test administered by a handheld device carried by police. The 
result of the preliminary test showed his breath alcohol content at 0.079 
grams per 210 liters of breath.41 Guerre-Chaley took another breath test 
at the police station, where the test gave a breath alcohol reading of 
0.091.42 At trial, Guerre-Chaley wished to introduce evidence of the 
preliminary breath test to contradict the results of the second test.43 The 
Court ruled that the preliminary result was inadmissible because 
Guerre-Chaley had failed to present any evidence that the test was 
scientifically valid under Alaska procedural standards.44 The same 
objection could be leveled against any testing device or testing 
procedure; a foundation must be laid that the proposed scientific 
evidence meets procedural standards for admissibility. 
A breath test is only scientifically valid if the instrument is 
functioning properly. Alaska has attempted to assure accuracy by 
adopting regulations prescribing the method for administering breath 
tests.45 For the results of a test to be admissible, the state must show 
“substantial compliance” with these regulations.46 With respect to the 
“Datamaster,” one important control is the use of a known quantity of 
an external source of alcohol (sometimes referred to as an “Alco bottle”), 
which is tested by the breathalyzer to determine accuracy.47 Before and 
 
 39.  Id. at 727. 
 40.  88 P.3d 539 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 41.  Id. at 541. 
 42.  Id. Afterward, Guerre-Chaley requested an actual blood test, which put 
his blood alcohol content at 0.095 percent. Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 63.040 (2012). 
 46.  Thayer v. Municipality of Anchorage, 686 P.2d 721, 727 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1984). 
 47. See generally ALASKA SCIENTIFIC CRIME DETECTION LABORATORY, BREATH 
ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAM MANUAL 27 (2013) [hereinafter BREATH ALCOHOL 
TESTING MANUAL] (describing the process of developing external standards); see 
also Ashenfelter v. State, No. 5920, 2013 WL 563182, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 
13, 2013) (memorandum opinion) (describing how Alco bottles are used to verify 
breathalyzer accuracy); James Halpin, Calibration Error Puts DUI Test in Question, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (July 29, 2010), http://www.adn.com/2010/07 
/29/1387533/calibration-error-puts-bac-tests.html (“The tanks contain a known 
sample of alcohol that the instrument measures before and after every test to 
ensure it is functioning properly.”). The Datamaster is “the only approved 
evidential breath test instrument in the State of Alaska.” BREATH ALCOHOL 
TESTING MANUAL at 10. 
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after each person blows into a Datamaster, the instrument takes a 
sample from the Alco bottle and analyzes it.48 If the actual results are 
within a certain range of the target value, the breathalyzer is considered 
sufficiently accurate.49 
Assuming the instrument is functioning properly, there are several 
sources of inaccuracy which may affect any individual reading. First, the 
measuring instrument itself is subject to a margin of error. According to 
the Alaska Breath Alcohol Testing Program Manual, “there exists an 
inherent uncertainty in the Datamaster-Alco breath testing system such 
that the sample analyzed may be considered to be accurate to within +/- 
.005 g/210L.”50 If one repeatedly uses a breathalyzer to analyze the exact 
same homogeneous gas/alcohol mixture in a controlled environment, 
the instrument will register different results due to the margin of error 
or inherent uncertainty. Because all measuring devices have a margin of 
error, this factor is present in every single breath test. 
A second source of uncertainty is calibration.  Improper calibration 
can yield further error, and even a properly calibrated instrument will 
drift away from accuracy over time. 
A third source of uncertainty is from the breath sample itself. A 
particular breath sample may not reflect a person’s level of sobriety for a 
variety of reasons. If a subject gargles alcohol-based mouthwash, then 
spits it out and blows into a breathalyzer, the instrument may register a 
high level of alcohol content in the breath. The machine may well 
indicate the subject is legally drunk, when obviously he is completely 
sober. Contaminated breath samples are such a well-known problem 
that Alaska regulations require a fifteen minute waiting period to ensure 
that the subject can be observed to ensure there is no regurgitation of 
alcohol into the throat or mouth.51 As noted above, a breath test is 
supposed to be testing alveolar air from the lungs; if the instrument is 
measuring something other than alveolar air (like mouth alcohol), then 
the test is invalid. 
Even without mouth alcohol present, a subject can blow into a 
functioning breath test instrument ten times and get ten different subject 
 
 48.  Ashenfelter, 2013 WL 563182, at *3. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.   SCIENTIFIC CRIME DETECTION LABORATORY, STATE OF ALASKA, ALASKA 
BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAM MANUAL, 3–17 (2008). In 2013, the 
Department of Public Safety issued a revised, considerably shorter Alaska 
Breath Alcohol Testing Program Manual which appears to omit discussion of 
inherent uncertainty in the sample analyzed; however, it does note that “[t]he 
allowable range for the external standard is +/- 0.005 from the target value 
adjusted for barometric pressure.” BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING MANUAL, supra 
note 47, at 27. 
 51.  ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 63.040(a)(1) (2012). 
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readings. The reason for this is that the amount of alcohol absorbed from 
the lungs varies from breath to breath based on a wide variety of factors. 
The alcohol concentration varies in the course of even a single 
exhalation. In fact, over the course of a single exhalation sample, the 
Datamaster analyzes the alcohol content four times each second (for 
perhaps as many as 100 individual measurements), and the instrument’s 
software uses this information to estimate a final result.52 In any event, 
even assuming a perfectly functioning measuring instrument, a person’s 
breath alcohol content is a constantly fluctuating target.  A good 
example of this variability comes from a recent case before the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals.  Minnesota uses a system of two breath 
samples with each breath tested twice, and the lowest of the four test 
results counted as the basis for a charge.53  The Court explains: 
The reading from the first sample was .131, with a replicate 
reading of .132, and the reading from the second sample was 
.119, with a replicate reading of .121. Officer Tamm testified 
that variation in the readings is common and expected, that no 
errors occurred in running the test, and that the machine 
functioned properly.54 
Variations in the test results of the same breath sample is due to the 
margin of error of the testing instrument, while the larger difference 
between the two breath samples is likely the result of the different 
alcohol content in subsequent breaths.  So a person can have a .080 
breath alcohol content and soon after have a .070.55 This is a factor which 
will be a source of uncertainty in every breath test. 
 
 52.  A graph of each individual breath measurement in the course of a single 
breath will present a curve with an initial steep incline then leveling off or 
declining. In theory if the instrument is testing mouth alcohol then the curve will 
be a downward slope instead of a plateau, and the Datamaster should register 
an error; but frequently the instrument cannot distinguish between mouth and 
lung alcohol. See C. Dennis Simpson et al., Effects of Mouth Alcohol on Breath 
Alcohol Results, 3 INT’L J. OF DRUG TESTING 1, 10 (2004) (showing that in laboratory 
tests the Datamaster correctly gave an error message for mouth alcohol only 52% 
of the time). 
 53.  State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Minn. App. Ct. 2012). 
 54.  Id. at 688.  While the body is constantly absorbing or eliminating alcohol 
from the blood, these replicate tests occur within a few minutes of each other, so 
elimination of alcohol could not account for such a  large disparity in replicate 
breath tests.  See State v. Lowe, 740 A.2d 348, 350 (Vt. 1999) (noting that when 
two test conducted minutes apart yield different values the source is likely the 
margin of error in testing rather than elimination of alcohol). 
 55.  See, e.g., State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v. Taylor-Caldwell, 229 P.3d 471, 
471 (Nev. 2010) (registering consecutive breath tests at 0.073 and 0.083); Lowe, 
740 A.2d at  350 (noting test results of .083 and .079); Thompson v. State, Dep’t of 
Licensing, 960 P.2d 475, 477 (1998) ("The results of the two breath tests revealed 
concentrations of .08 and .07."). 
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None of these sources of uncertainty are news. Courts around the 
country have dealt with these issues for years. Legislatures have often 
responded by redefining the crime of DUI in a way that avoids the 
margin of error problem. These redefinitions have often resulted in 
convoluted DUI statutes, as we will see in the following section. 
III. THE ELEMENTS OF DUI—WHAT DOES THE STATE HAVE TO 
PROVE? 
Section 28.35.030 of the Alaska Statutes makes it a crime to be in 
control of a vehicle “if, as determined by a chemical test taken within 
four hours after the alleged operating or driving, there is 0.08 percent or 
more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood or if there is 0.08 grams 
or more of alcohol per 210 liters of the person’s breath.”56  There are two 
ambiguities present in this formulation. First, when is the test result 
relevant: at the time of driving, or at the time of testing? And second, 
does the phrase “as determined by” make the test results unassailable? 
The statute provides for an offense when “there is 0.08 percent or 
more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood” within four hours. This 
strongly suggests that the State must prove an actual breath or blood 
alcohol level used as the basis for the offense. 
That the test result is not the element of the offense is more obvious 
from other parts of the statute. Section 28.35.030(s) provides: “In a 
prosecution under (a) of this section, a person may introduce evidence 
on the amount of alcohol consumed before or after operating or driving 
the motor vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft to rebut or explain the results of 
a chemical test . . . .”57 
Obviously, if the test itself were an element of the offense there 
would be no rebuttal. Yet under subsection (s), a person can testify, “I 
may have had a subject sample of .150, but that can’t possibly be 
accurate because I had only one glass of wine.” Thus, subsection (s), 
when read in conjunction with subsection (a), shows that subsection (a) 
cannot be read to make the test result the element of the offense. The test 
result is evidence that can be rebutted by contradictory evidence. 
It should also be noted that a number of states use (or at one point 
used) “as determined by” language in their DUI statutes. Alabama, 
Arkansas, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Washington, and Virginia all have similar language to Alaska’s 
“as determined by a chemical test” provision.58 Each of these states has 
 
 56.  ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(2) (2012). 
 57.  ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(s) (2012). 
 58.  ALA. CODE § 32-5A-194 (2012) (“[E]vidence of the amount of alcohol or 
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held, however, that this language does not make the test result an 
element of the offense, and that a defendant still has the right to present 
evidence challenging the apparent test results.59 As the Virginia Court of 
 
controlled substance in a person's blood at the alleged time, as determined by a 
chemical analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance, 
shall be admissible.”);  ARK. STAT. 5-65-103(b) (2000) (making  it a crime to drive 
when “there was one tenth of one percent (0.10%) or more by weight of alcohol 
in the person’s blood as determined by a chemical test”); MINN. STAT. § 169A.20 
(2012) (“[It is a crime for a person to operate a vehicle when] the person’s alcohol 
concentration at the time, or as measured within two hours of the time, of 
driving, operating, or being in physical control of the motor vehicle is 0.08 or 
more.”); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195 (McKinney 2013) (“The following effect 
shall be given to evidence of blood-alcohol content, as determined by such tests, 
of a person arrested for violation of . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE 4511.19(D)(1)(b) (“In 
any criminal prosecution . . .the court may admit evidence on the concentration 
of alcohol, … at the time of the alleged violation as shown by chemical analysis 
of the substance”);  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 813.010 (West 2012) (“[A person is 
committing a DUI if he h]as 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the 
blood of the person as shown by chemical analysis of the breath or blood of the 
person . . . .”); R.I. GEN. LAW. § 31-27-2(b)(1) ("Any person charged under 
subsection (a) of this section whose blood alcohol concentration is eight one-
hundredths of one percent (.08%) or more by weight as shown by a chemical 
analysis of a blood, breath, or urine sample shall be guilty of violating 
subsection (a) of this section.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-23-1 (2012) (“No person 
may drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle while . . . [t]here is 0.08 
percent or more by weight of alcohol in that person's blood as shown by 
chemical analysis of that person's breath, blood, or other bodily substance.”); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502 (2012) (“[A person is guilty of DUI if] the person 
has, within two hours after driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher as 
shown by analysis of the person's breath . . . .”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (2012) 
(“It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle, 
engine or train . . . while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 
percent or more by weight by volume or 0.08 grams or more per 210 liters of 
breath as indicated by a chemical test administered as provided in this article . . . 
.”). 
 59.  Goodwin v. State, 728 So.2d 662, 668 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (explaining 
that the statute creates no more than a presumption of intoxication); Jones v. 
State, 2011 Ark. App. 403, 404 n.1 (Ark. App. 2011) (explaining that elimination 
of the phrase “as determined by a chemical test” in the statute was not a 
substantive change in the law); State v. Birk, 687 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Minn. App. 
2004) (explaining that test result does not create a presumption and jury may 
refuse to accept test results); People v. Mertz, 497 N.E. 2d 657, 600-63) (N.Y. 
1986); State v. West, 279 P.3d 354 (Or. App. 2012) (“[T]he amount of alcohol in a 
person's blood at the time the person is alleged to have been driving a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants, as shown by chemical analysis 
of the person's breath or blood, is indirect evidence that may be used at trial, 
along with other evidence, to determine whether the person was in fact under 
the influence of intoxicants.”); State v. Ensey, 881 A.2d 81, 88 (R.I. 2005) (“Once a 
trial justice determines that particular breathalyzer test results are admissible 
and those results are admitted, a defendant may offer competent evidence to 
rebut the inference that the test result was accurate.”);  S.D. CODIFIED LAW 32-23-
7 specifies that a chemical test gives rise to a presumption (“In any criminal 
prosecution for . . . a violation of § 22-16-41, the amount of alcohol in the 
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Appeals explained in Davis v. Commonwealth,60 the testing measurement 
“is an evidentiary fact which creates a rebuttable presumption that the 
measurement accurately reflects the blood alcohol concentration at the 
time of driving.”61 
The Ohio statute is similar to Alaska’s in that Ohio defines the 
offence in 4511.19(A)(1) making it a crime to drive a vehicle “under the 
influence of alcohol” or with a blood alcohol level of .080 or more. Then 
in 4511.19(D)(1)(b) the Ohio statute goes on to provide that a court may 
admit evidence of a violation “as shown by chemical analysis of the 
substance withdrawn within three hours of the time of the alleged 
violation.”  The Ohio Supreme Court has held that 4511.19(D)(1)(b) is a 
rule of evidence not part of the definition of the offense.62 Most 
importantly, putting aside the confusion surrounding the “working 
tolerance” statute, the Alaska Court of Appeals has since held that the 
phrase “as determined by a chemical test” does not make the test itself 
determinative of the offense.63 For the few years that the court of appeals 
held that the test was an element of the offense, this interpretation was 
based on the “working tolerance” statute,64 not on the “as determined 
by” language.65 A careful reading of the Alaska case law shows that a 
breath test is evidence of a defendant’s actual breath alcohol level, and 
this evidence, like any other evidence, is subject to attack. To understand 
how the evidence-element confusion originated, and the current status 
of the law in this regard, the next section will summarize the main 
opinions on DUI law in Alaska over the past three decades. 
 
defendant’s blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the 
defendant’s blood, breath, or other bodily substance shall give rise to the 
following presumptions . . .”); City of Seattle v. Gellein, 768 P.2d 470 (Wash. 
1989) (en banc). 
 60.  381 S.E.2d 11 (Va. Ct. App. 1989). 
 61.  Id. at 15. 
 62.  State v. Mayl, 106 Ohio St. 3d 207, 210 (2005) (“Yet no matter under 
which portion of R.C. 4511.19(A) a person is charged, the state has the 
opportunity to offer the results of a ‘bodily substance’ test to show either 
impairment—under (A)(1)(a)—or to show that the statutory concentrations of 
alcohol or drugs have been exceeded—under (A)(1)(b) through (i) and (B). R.C. 
4511.19(D)(1) discusses when these results may be admitted in a criminal 
prosecution.”) 
 63.  Conrad v. State, 54 P.3d 313, 314–15 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (“We find no 
indication that the Alaska Legislature . . . intended to shift the focus away from 
the defendant’s blood alcohol level at the time of driving and to make the test 
result determinative of the defendant’s guilt.”) superseded by statute, Act effective 
July 1, 2004,  2004 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 124 §§ 25, 27, as recognized in Valentine 
v. State, 215 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2009). 
 64.  ALASKA STAT. § 28.90.020(a) (2012). 
 65.  ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030 (2012). 
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IV. THE CONVOLUTED HISTORY OF ALASKA’S DUI CASE LAW 
Our story begins in 1976 with Lauderdale v. State.66 At that time, a 
breath sample was captured in a glass ampoule and tested by passing 
light through the ampoule.67 After testing Lauderdale’s sample, the State 
either discarded or lost the ampoule.68 Lauderdale argued that he had 
been denied due process because the government had destroyed 
evidence and had not permitted him a chance to independently verify 
the alleged results.69 The Alaska Supreme Court considered this issue so 
important that it took the unusual step of hearing an appeal on the 
suppression issue before entry of final judgment at trial, noting that “the 
matter is of sufficient importance to justify deviation from the normal 
appellate procedure.”70 
The central holding of Lauderdale was that in a criminal prosecution 
for DUI, a defendant must be able to “cross-examine the results of the 
[breathalyzer] test.”71 As part of this right to examine the reliability of 
the test, the supreme court ordered that a fundamental due process right 
requires the state to preserve a sample of the breath for later testing.72 
One source of a false test was if the ampoule itself had a defect which 
could affect the testing. In this case, the test used only 10 randomly 
selected ampoules out of an available lot of 10,000, pursuant to 
regulatory requirements meant to help ensure quality of the sample.73 
The court noted that testing only one ampoule per thousand for quality 
was not much assurance of accuracy, and was “an additional argument 
in favor of Lauderdale’s contention that he should be permitted to check 
the specific ampoules used in his test.”74 
Six years later, in Municipality of Anchorage v. Serrano,75 the court of 
appeals encountered a similar situation.76 However, rather than the 
 
 66.  548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976). 
 67.  See id. at 378–79 (describing ampoule breathalyzer process). 
 68.  Id. at 381. 
 69.  Id. at 380. 
 70.  Id. at 378. 
 71.  Id. at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72.  Id. at 382. Subsequently the court held that due process was satisfied if 
the police at least make a second test available to the defendant, and inform her 
of the right to an independent test. See Gundersen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 
792 P.2d 673, 676–77 (Alaska 1990) (“[I]t is not necessary to preserve a breath 
sample in order to provide a defendant with a reasonable opportunity to obtain 
an independent test. . . . [The state] also may provide this opportunity by 
notifying a defendant of his right to an independent test and assisting [him] in 
obtaining one.”). 
 73.  Lauderdale, 548 P.2d at 380. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  649 P.2d 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 76.  See id. at 258 (“[T]he due process clause of the Alaska Constitution 
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general Alaska statute the defendant was prosecuted under the 
Anchorage statute, which provided: 
A person commits the crime of driving while intoxicated if he 
operates, drives or is in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle . . . when there is 0.10 grams or more of alcohol per 210 
liters of his breath as determined by a chemical test within four 
hours of his arrest . . . .”77 
The phrase “as determined by a chemical test” had recently been 
added to the statute, so the court was interpreting it for the first time.78 
The Serrano court assumed that the phrase “as determined by a chemical 
test” had not changed the elements of the offense, and that a defendant 
had a clear right to challenge the accuracy of the test: 
We conclude that due process does require the state and the 
municipality to take reasonable steps to attempt to preserve 
breath samples for defendants for their independent analysis or 
to provide some other alternative check of the breathalyzer 
results. . . . The ability of the defendant to “cross-examine” 
these tests is critical to his case and to the integrity of the 
criminal justice system.79 
Thus the Court implicitly stated that “operat[ing] a car with a 
certain level of blood or breath alcohol” was the element of the offense, 
and the breath test result was critical evidence—but just evidence.80 In 
the thirty years since Serrano, the Alaska Court of Appeals has never 
changed its interpretation of the phrase “as determined by a chemical 
test.” 
After the Court’s order in Serrano, the State adopted a system 
preserving breath samples in tubes.81 The breath sample was first tested 
in the breathalyzer in use at the time, the Intoximeter 3000, and then the 
air was captured in a magnesium perchlorate tube (“MPT”).82 
 
requires the prosecution to make reasonable efforts to preserve a breath sample 
or to take other steps to allow a defendant to verify the results of the 
breathalyzer test.”). 
 77.  Id. at 257 n.3 (emphasis added) (quoting ANCHORAGE MUN. CODE 
9.28.020(B) (1981)). 
 78.  See 649 P.2d at 257 n.3 (noting that the quoted language had been added 
in 1981—this case came before the court in 1982). 
 79.  Id. at 259. 
 80.  Id. (“By making it an offense to operate a car with a certain level of blood 
or breath alcohol, the current state statute and the city ordinance both place 
great emphasis on the breath tests.”). 
 81.  Best v. Municipality of Anchorage, 712 P.2d 892, 898–99 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1985). 
 82.  Id. at 899. 
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Because the samples in the MPT could be preserved, it was possible 
to test each sample repeatedly.83 The repeated testing, however, revealed 
a large margin of error in the MPT method. For example, William 
Walker registered an apparent .13 breath alcohol level on the 
Intoximeter. The preserved sample was then tested four separate times 
with apparent results of .071, .064, .094, and .063 (for an average of 
.073).84  The preserved sample thus appeared to call into question the 
Intoximeter result, but the MPT samples themselves were so diverse that 
one could question how reliable these test results were. This system was 
only used for about a year before it was abandoned, but during that year 
dozens of criminal cases were dismissed because the retest results were 
substantially lower than the Intoximeter results.85 
In Best v. Municipality of Anchorage,86 Best argued that the entire 
MPT system denied him due process because retests confirmed the 
breathalyzer results only half the time, so there was no assurance of 
accuracy.87 The trial court in Anchorage v. Hernandez, with which Best’s 
case was consolidated,88 ruled that “to the extent that the [average] 
results of the re-test are accurate within 15% of the Intoximeter, this 
Court finds no basis on which to suppress the Intoximeter or re-test 
results.”89  However, if the retest was off by more than 15% then the trial 
court ordered the result suppressed as this showed the particular 
Intoximeter result was unreliable.90 
Wanting the trial court to go even further, Best argued that the 
testing procedure was so flawed as to be virtually meaningless so no 
MPT test results should be admissible.91 Because Best’s sample was 
never retested, the trial judge refused to suppress Best’s Intoximeter 
result, ruling that by failing to even have his sample retested he lacked 
standing to make the argument.92 The court of appeals agreed with Best, 
 
 83.  Id. at 902. 
 84.  Id. at app. A (listing Intoximeter results). 
 85.  See State v. Kerr, 712 P.2d 400, 404 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (explaining 
that a three judge panel in Fairbanks dismissed forty DUI cases as a result of the 
retest results). 
 86.  Best, 712 P.2d at 892. 
 87.  See id. at 893–94 (filing a motion to suppress Intoximeter results based on 
Judge Andrews' dissenting opinion in Hernandez). 
 88.  Id. at 898. 
 89.  Id. at 893. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 894 (“[T]he essence of the [objection] was that there was no 
need to have the tubes tested, because the procedures were so poor that the 
results in an individual case were irrelevant.”). This seems to have been 
essentially a due process argument. 
 92.  Id. at 894. 
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however, and vacated the trial court’s decision,93 explaining, “[i]f all 
MPTs are so flawed that an accurate retest is impossible, it cannot be 
said that those furnished MPTs have been furnished with a means of 
either verifying or casting doubt upon a breath test result.”94 
Accordingly, the court held that the trial court had erred in not 
considering Best’s argument and remanded for further proceedings 
clarifying the accuracy of the retesting procedure.95 Nevertheless, the 
court’s ruling on the legal issue appears to be clear: the average retest 
was within 15% of the Intoximeter only 50% of time, and whether a 
particular defendant was guilty or innocent rested on a “purely 
fortuitous” 50/50 chance.96 Thus, Best affirmed again that due process 
requires a meaningful opportunity to challenge the accuracy of a breath 
test result.97 
To provide people this opportunity, the Alaska Supreme Court 
addressed breath testing again in Champion v. Department of Public 
Safety.98 Champion was another license revocation case deciding what the 
state had to prove to revoke a person’s license.99 The language of the 
civil revocation statute provided for license revocation when a chemical 
test “produced a result described in AS 28.35.030(a)(2),” the criminal 
DUI statute.100 The criminal statute provided that if there was 0.10 grams 
or more of alcohol per 210 liters of the person’s breath, determined “by a 
chemical test taken within four hours after the alleged operating or 
driving,” then that person was guilty of driving while intoxicated.101 The 
license revocation statute was thus ambiguous as to what the “result” 
was. Champion held that revocation had to be based on the actual alcohol 
level, not just the test result.102 This was because due process required 
 
 93.  Id. at 896 (“Because we cannot affirm either on grounds of untimeliness 
or lack of ‘standing,’ we remand this case to the trial court.”). 
 94.  Id. at 895; see also id. at 896 (“Judge Andrews’ findings suggest that the 
MPT system was at times working so poorly that whether or not a given MPT 
result was close to the Intoximeter result was almost purely fortuitous.”). 
 95.  Id. at 898. 
 96.  Id. at 896. 
 97.  Such an opportunity, according to the Alaska Supreme Court, has been 
afforded people in custody through the voluntary drawing of blood. See 
Gundersen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673, 687 (Alaska 1990) 
(“[T]hat Gundersen was not given his choice of reasonable facilities at which to 
take the test also did not deny him due process.”). 
 98.  721 P.2d 131 (Alaska 1986). 
 99.  See id. at 132 (“Champion argues that the due process clause of the 
Alaska Constitution requires the state to take reasonable steps to preserve the 
breath sample or to provide some other means for the defendant in a license 
revocation proceeding to independently verify the breath test results.”). 
 100.  Id. at 131 n.1. 
 101.  ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(2) (2009). 
 102.  See Champion, 721 P.2d at 133 (“The ability of the defendant to evaluate 
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that the civil defendant be given an opportunity to challenge the 
accuracy of the test. 
A year later in Barcott v. Department of Public Safety, Division of 
Motor Vehicles,103 the Supreme Court again addressed a citizen’s right to 
challenge breath test results. Barcott, after being pulled over, had a 
breath alcohol content of .10 according to the breathalyzer being used, 
the Intoximeter 3000.104 However, just prior to Barcott’s breath test, the 
officer conducted two control tests using a sample with a known target 
value of .103.105 The tests produced readings of .104 and .097, 
respectively.106 
At the time Barcott’s breath test was administered, the legal limit 
was .10, leaving the test result right on the line.107 Because the two 
control tests produced results .007 apart, it was clear that the machine 
had some margin of error.108 The Court held that defendants in 
administrative license revocation proceedings are entitled to challenge 
the reliability and credibility of breath tests.109 As the smallest error in 
his favor would have placed Barcott under .10, the Court held that this 
margin of error was enough for Barcott to prevail.110 
Barcott went on to hold that even in a license revocation 
proceeding, the burden was on the State to prove the person was 
actually above .10, factoring in potential margin of error.111 This made 
clear that having a breath alcohol over .10 (or .08), not the test result 
itself, was the element of the offense, and that as a matter of law, the 
State could not prove breath alcohol to be above the legal limit when the 
test result was within the procedure’s margin of error.112 Even more 
relevant to the discussion of the “working tolerance” statute, Barcott 
rejected the State’s argument that the legislature could prohibit 
consideration of a margin of error.113 Thus, the Court seemed to hold 
 
these [breath] tests is critical to his ability to present his case. To deny a driver a 
reasonable opportunity to test the reliability and credibility of the breath test is 
to deny him a meaningful and fundamentally fair hearing.”). 
 103.  741 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1987). 
 104.  Id. at 227. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 229. 
 108.  Id. at 227. 
 109.  See id. at 228 (“The reasoning of Champion leads inescapably to the 
conclusion that due process requires consideration of the margin of error 
inherent in the breath testing procedure used in this case.”). 
 110.  Id. at 229. 
 111.  Id. at 230. 
 112.  See id. at 229 (ruling in favor of Barcott when his tests were at the legal 
limit because this evidence was not sufficient to prove breath alcohol at or over 
the legal limit.) 
 113.  See id. at 230 (“Champion mandates that the defendant in a license 
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quite explicitly that the legislature cannot mandate that the results of a 
chemical test be conclusively presumed accurate. 
In Haynes v. State, Department of Public Safety,114 the Court again 
addressed the due process right to challenge breath test results.115 While 
it upheld the prior rulings guaranteeing that any margin of error must 
be presumed to favor a defendant,116 the Court said that this was a due 
process right the legislature could revoke in the context of a civil license 
revocation proceeding.117 
Thus, even though Haynes held that the inherent margin of error 
must be imputed to the defendant in a license revocation proceeding, 
the Court drew a distinction in dicta that would confuse the DUI 
discussion for years to come. This distinction was between a statute 
which makes an element of the offense testing above a per se limit as 
opposed to actually having a blood alcohol level above a per se limit.118 
Nevertheless, the idea that some states had made a test result the 
element of a criminal offense was largely fictitious.119 Furthermore, 
Haynes, like many of the cases cited to support the Court’s distinction, 
was a civil license forfeiture case, not a criminal case. In Nugent v. Iowa 
 
revocation proceeding has the constitutionally guaranteed right to challenge the 
accuracy of the breath test independently. We have thus concluded that due 
process will not allow the results of a chemical test authorized under AS 
28.35.031(a) to be conclusively presumed accurate.”). 
 114.  865 P.2d 753 (Alaska 1993). 
 115.  Id. at 756. 
 116.  See id.  (“[W]e hold that a chemical breath test reading or result which 
may be reduced below the level of .10 grams per 210 liters of the person's breath, 
by applying the margin of error inherent in the particular test used, cannot serve 
as the basis for a license revocation . . . .”). 
 117.  See id. at 755–56 (“The legislature has the power to require the revocation 
of a driver's license on the basis of a particular test result or reading, despite its 
inherent margin of error, when the legislature expressly considers that margin 
and deems it sufficiently negligible such that it may be disregarded. . . .  Absent 
express legislative intent to the contrary, we hold that failure to apply the 
inherent margin of error of a particular testing device in favor of the person 
subject to license revocation violates due process of law as guaranteed by the 
Alaska Constitution.") (Emphasis added)   The Court never explicitly said that 
the legislature could prohibit margin of error consideration in a criminal case. 
 118.  See id. at 755 (citing Barcott, 741 P.2d at 229) (“In the course of our 
analysis, we examined how courts in other jurisdictions interpreted their own 
DWI statutes with regard to the issue of inherent margin of error in a chemical 
blood/breath alcohol test.”). The court went on to compare states that 
interpreted DWI statutes  to create an offense upon a test reading in excess of the 
statutory limit with states that require the fact finder to consider the inherent 
margin of error in their decision.  Id. 
 119.  See People v. Mertz, 497 N.E.2d 657, 660–63 (N.Y. 1986) (examining case 
law from many American jurisdictions and noting that no state in a criminal case 
made a test result irrebuttable); see also State v. Scisney, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9605-
CC-00209, 1997 WL 634515 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 16, 1997) (stating the same). 
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Department of Transportation,120 cited by the Haynes Court,121 the Court 
was careful to point out the different concerns between civil and 
criminal cases considering blood-alcohol evidence.122 
This difference between civil and criminal proceedings is vital 
because of the different levels of proof necessary in the two types of 
proceedings. Yet Haynes carelessly extended its holding in a civil case to 
criminal cases by asserting that “[s]ome courts read their DWI statute . . . 
to create an offense of registering a blood/breath alcohol test reading in 
excess of the statutory limit.”123 Because Haynes was itself a license 
revocation proceeding, citing those other cases was appropriate, but the 
Court unfortunately suggested that doing so in a criminal case would 
also be acceptable, erroneously saying that other states had done so. 
Following the Court’s decision in Haynes, the State was required 
under the breath alcohol theory of intoxication to submit evidence of a 
breath test result of at least .110 because the .010 margin of error was 
imputed in the defendant’s favor.124 In 1996, however, the Alaska 
legislature adopted a statute stating that the “working tolerance” of an 
instrument, or its margin of error, should no longer be considered in 
either criminal or civil proceedings.125 Thus, while the adopted statute 
appears to implicitly overrule Haynes’ central holding, Haynes’ legacy 
 
 120.  390 N.W.2d 125, 128 (Iowa 1986). 
 121.  Haynes, 865 P.2d at 755. 
 122.  See Nugent, 390 N.W.2d at 128 (“Plaintiff relies on several criminal, not 
administrative, cases from other jurisdictions. Those decisions hold the state 
must show a blood-alcohol concentration that takes into account the variance or 
margin of error in order to support a criminal conviction. Although the issue 
presented here does arise in the criminal context as shown by the above cases, 
different concerns are addressed in civil administrative proceedings. Thus, the 
criminal cases cited by plaintiff are not controlling in this situation.”); see also 
Lara v. Tanaka, 924 P.2d 192, 195 (Hawaii 1996) (“[A] statistically significant 
possibility that a driver’s actual BAC is below the legal limit does not overcome 
the presumption of innocence by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But we 
cannot conclude that, because of that possibility, it is impossible to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a driver’s actual BAC exceeded the legal 
limit.”). 
 123.  Haynes, 865 P.2d at 758. 
 124.  See Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchorage, 974 P.2d 427, 429 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1999) (“In essence, the Haynes decision required the State to introduce 
an Intoximeter result of .11 percent or higher in order to prove a defendant 
guilty of driving while intoxicated under [ALASKA STAT. §] 28.35.030(a)(2) or the 
equivalent Anchorage municipal ordinance, [ANCHORAGE MUN. CODE §] 
9.28.020(B)(2).”). 
 125.  See ALASKA STAT. § 28.40.060 (1996) (“[I]f an offense described under 
[Title 28] requires that a chemical test of a person’s breath produce a particular 
result, and the chemical test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument 
approved by the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute is 
not affected by the instrument’s working tolerance.”). This statute is now 
ALASKA STAT. § 28.90.020 (2012). 
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would continue because of the aforementioned confusion, conflating 
civil and criminal cases. 
V. MANGIAPANE AND BUSHNELL: THE COURT UPHOLDS THE 
“WORKING TOLERANCE” STATUTE 
In 1999 the Alaska Court of Appeals construed the “working 
tolerance” statute for the first time in Mangiapane v. Municipality of 
Anchorage.126 Mangiapane’s apparent breath test result was .112.127 He 
requested an independent blood test, drawn 40 minutes later, with a 
result of .10.128 Mangiapane’s breath sample of .112, even applying the 
.010 margin of error in his favor, still would have resulted in guilt.129 
Furthermore, guilt also could have potentially been shown from the 
blood test result of .100.130 Relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s 
Haynes dicta, the Court of Appeals explained that “[t]he fact that the 
driver’s true blood-alcohol or breath-alcohol level may be slightly lower 
[than the Intoximeter’s reading] (due to the Intoximeter’s acknowledged 
margin of error) is no longer relevant to the driver’s guilt under AS 
28.35.030(a)(2).”131 The true alcohol level was irrelevant because the test 
itself was thought to be the element of the offense; that is, at trial the 
State only had to prove there was a test result of .100 or more. 
This interpretation of the “working tolerance” statute was unusual. 
On its face the provision that “the result described by statute is not 
affected by the instrument’s working tolerance” seems to state a rule of 
evidence. It does not appear to modify the elements of the offense in any 
way which is defined in AS 28.35.030, and which had long been 
established to make actual blood alcohol level an element of the offense, 
and not the test result itself. Nor does the legislative history suggest that 
there was intent to modify the elements of the criminal offense.132 
 
 126.  Mangiapane, 974 P.2d at 427. 
 127.  Id. at 428. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See id. at 429. Since the result was above the .11 percent Haynes threshold 
required to prove a defendant guilty of DUI, adjusting for the margin of error 
would still result in a breath test result over the legal limit. 
 130.  Id. at 430 (“[ALASKA STAT. §] 28.40.060 effectively declares that a driver 
violates [ALASKA STAT. §] 28.35.030(a)(2) if, within four hours of driving, the 
driver is tested on a properly calibrated, properly functioning Intoximeter and 
the driver's test result is at least .10 percent blood-alcohol or the equivalent .10 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.”) (emphasis in original). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  The legislative history indicates that initially, the Working Tolerance 
provision was not part of the bill, and H.B. 204 was directed at establishing 
“zero tolerance” for underage drinking and driving, by making it an infraction 
for an underage person to drive a vehicle with any alcohol whatsoever in her 
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The “working tolerance” statute was discussed more thoroughly a 
year after Mangiapane in Bushnell v. State.133 Unlike Mangiapane, 
Bushnell’s apparent result of .109 put a legal reading within the known 
margin of error.134 
In light of Mangiapane’s holding, Bushnell did not attack 
Mangiapane head-on but instead argued that the legislature had 
unconstitutionally delegated too much power to the Department of 
Public Safety (“DPS”) by allowing the DPS to determine the acceptable 
margin of error.135 In other words, if the legislature says that the 
working tolerance or margin of error cannot be considered and then 
gives the executive branch authority to adopt any instrument or any 
margin of error it chooses, then the legislature has effectively permitted 
the executive branch to define the crime. 
Bushnell began by quoting Haynes, claiming that the Supreme Court 
had “indicated that the legislature had the power to base the offense of 
DWI on a particular test result, and that a margin of error that it 
considered ‘tolerably accurate’ could be disregarded.”136 The court then 
concluded that since the legislature had the Intoximeter’s long history of 
use in the State of Alaska as guidance,137 the legislature, by responding 
to Haynes with AS 28.40.060, implicitly found that a working tolerance 
of .01 percent of a properly calibrated instrument was “tolerably 
inaccurate.”138 
To put Mangiapane and Bushnell in perspective, it is worthwhile to 
compare them to a New York case which presented almost exactly the 
same issue. New York for the past three decades has had a law which is 
similar to Alaska’s “working tolerance” statute. New York’s Vehicle and 
Traffic Law § 1195 [1] provides: 
Upon the trial of any action or proceeding arising out of actions 
alleged to have been committed by any person arrested for a 
 
system. See ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 19th Leg., 2d Sess. 495 (Feb. 27, 1995) available at 
www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_jrn_page.asp?session=19&bill=HB204&jrn=049
5&hse=H. 
 133.  5 P.3d 889 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000). 
 134.  Id. at 890. 
 135.  See id. (“Bushnell argues that [ALASKA STAT. §] 28.40.060 violates his due 
process rights because it allows the Department of Public Safety to approve any 
instrument, even one which is very inaccurate, to establish his level of 
intoxication.”) 
 136.  Id. at 891.  As noted above, the Supreme Court in fact only said that the 
legislature could base “license revocation” on a test result.  Haynes, 865 P.2d at 
755. 
 137.  See id. (“When enacting [ALASKA STAT. §] 28.40.060, the legislature not 
only had the Haynes decision for guidance, it also had the Intoximeter’s long 
history of use in [the State of Alaska].”). 
 138.  Id. at 892. 
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violation of any subdivision of [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 
1192], the court shall admit evidence of the amount of alcohol 
or drugs in the defendant’s blood as shown by a test 
administered pursuant to the provisions of [Vehicle and Traffic 
Law § 1194].139 
While this language could be interpreted to require the evidence 
only be considered “as shown by a test” result, the New York Court of 
Appeals in People v. Mertz140 ultimately held that such an interpretation 
would be constitutionally problematic.141 New York’s highest court held 
that “[e]vidence that a breathalyzer test administered within two hours 
of arrest showed defendant to have such a BAC is sufficient to establish 
a prima facie a violation . . . .”142 However, the Court continued that, it 
was “error not to permit defendant’s attorney to argue on the basis of 
evidence . . . from which it could be found that defendant’s BAC at the 
time of the vehicle operation was less than .10% . . . .”143 
Mertz was in an accident at approximately 2 A.M.144 He was taken 
to the hospital and submitted two breath test samples to a 
breathalyzer.145 The first “taken at 3:25 A.M. yielded a .15 reading. The 
second, taken at 3:35 A.M., after the instrument had been purged, 
recorded a reading of .16.”146 These results raised a number of disputes 
between the prosecution and the defense. The first issue was which, if 
any, of the tests was most accurate.147 The defense essentially wanted to 
argue that the fact that the second test result was .010 higher ten minutes 
later showed that the blood alcohol was rising rapidly and therefore 
Mertz was most likely under the legal limit when he had driven the car 
over an hour earlier.148 The State’s expert witness argued that it was 
impossible to know if the two tests were both accurate; the variation 
could have resulted “because not a deep enough sample was obtained at 
the two different times or because one sample was longer than the 
other.”149 Most defense attorneys would regard the state’s own expert 
 
 139.  N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195 (2012). 
 140.  497 N.E.2d 657 (N.Y. 1986). 
 141.  See id. at 662. (“To foreclose a defendant's introduction of evidence 
seeking to establish that his BAC while operating was less than .10 may raise 
doubt as to constitutionality.”). 
 142.  Id. at 658. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  See id. at 659 (discussing the presentations by the arresting officer and a 
professor of physiology about the potential problems of each test). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
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witness arguing for the uncertainty of the state’s evidence as a godsend. 
But the trial judge precluded the defense from arguing either that the 
tests were inaccurate, or that the tests were accurate and showed a rising 
level of alcohol.150 
The Mertz case raised a number of both statutory and constitutional 
questions. First, the New York DUI statute provided: “No person shall 
operate a motor vehicle while he has .10 of one per centum or more by 
weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by chemical analysis of his blood, 
breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section 
eleven hundred ninety-four of this chapter.”151 Thus the statute made it 
an offense to have a blood or breath alcohol level of .100 “while driving” 
but “as shown by” a later test. Other provisions permitted the chemical 
test to be made “within two hours after such person has been placed 
under arrest for any such violation” and further directed that the court 
shall admit evidence of the amount of alcohol or drugs in the 
defendant’s blood “as shown by” a test administered pursuant to the 
provisions of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194. Thus the initial question of 
statutory interpretation was simply: what is the element of the offense—
did the state need to prove .100 breath alcohol level at the time of 
driving, at the time of testing, or merely show a test result at any time 
within two hours? 
The Court of Appeals held that the DUI statute defining the crime 
in § 1192 as a breath alcohol level of .100 “while driving” had to be taken 
at face value.152 Thus, the Court concluded that “[t]o foreclose a 
defendant’s introduction of evidence seeking to establish that his BAC 
while operating was less than .10 may raise doubt as to 
constitutionality . . . .”153 As a result, defendant must be allowed to argue 
the significance of such evidence, if it exists, to a jury.154 
Obviously the New York Court of Appeals is not infallible and 
Mertz is only persuasive precedent. Nevertheless, Mertz is the more 
persuasive case. When a crime is defined in one section and another 
section has a provision relating to admissibility of evidence, it is difficult 
to read the evidentiary provision as anything but an evidentiary 
 
 150.  See id. (“[W]hen defendant's attorney during summation began to argue 
that it was fair to infer from the fact that defendant's BAC was rising at 3:35 that 
at the earlier time when he was driving it was much lower, the Trial Judge 
responded to the prosecutor's objection by stating in the presence of the jury that 
the only question for the jury was whether the sample was taken within two 
hours of arrest and showed a BAC in excess of .10.”). 
 151.  Id. at 664 (quoting N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 2013)) 
(emphasis added). 
 152.  Id. at 658. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
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provision. As an evidentiary provision, it cannot create a non-rebuttable 
presumption of accuracy and not violate due process. 
More importantly, both the Alaska Court of Appeals and the 
Alaska Supreme Court subsequently rejected the idea that the test result 
was the element of the offense, but the ghost of Mangiapane has 
continued to haunt Alaska by casting continued confusion over DUI 
cases. 
VI. THE RETREAT FROM MANGIAPANE 
Three years after Mangiapane, the court of appeals again took up the 
issue in Conrad v. State.155 While not explicitly overruling Mangiapane, 
the court stated, “we did not speak carefully enough” in addressing the 
issue in Mangiapane.156 
Conrad was stopped by police and was later given a breathalyzer; 
his sample registered over the per se level.157 Conrad argued that he had 
not yet metabolized the alcohol while driving and was perfectly sober at 
the time of driving; it was only much later that his breath alcohol level 
had gone over the legal limit.158 Conrad did not dispute the apparent 
accuracy of the test at the time it was given—he argued instead that the 
test did not reflect his level of sobriety at the time he drove. 
Obviously, if the element of the offense were simply a test result 
above .080, then this defense could not work. But the Court in Conrad 
unambiguously rejected the idea that the test result itself was the 
element of the offense, explaining that they found “no indication that 
the Alaska Legislature, either when it passed AS 28.35.030(a)(2) or when 
it later passed AS 28.40.060 [the “working tolerance” statute], intended 
to shift the focus away from the defendant’s blood alcohol level at the 
time of driving and to make the test result determinative of the 
defendant’s guilt.”159 Thus, the Court acknowledged that it used less 
than perfect language in Mangiapane,160 and reaffirmed that a 
defendant’s guilt “hinges on the defendant’s blood alcohol content at the 
 
 155.  54 P.3d 313 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (superseded by statute with respect 
to the time of testing). 
 156.  Id. at 314. 
 157.  See id. (“[Conrad] submitted to an Intoximeter test; the test result was a 
blood alcohol level of 0.154 percent.”). 
 158.  See id. (“Conrad presented what he called the ‘big gulp’ defense: He 
claimed that he had quickly consumed two beers just before he drove. Conrad 
contended that even though his blood alcohol level was illegally high an hour or 
so later after he was stopped, his blood alcohol level had been within legal limits 
at the time he was driving.”). 
 159.  Id. at 315. 
 160.  See id. at 314 (stating, after referencing Mangiapane, that “[w]e now 
conclude that we did not speak carefully enough”). 
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time the defendant operated or controlled a motor vehicle.”161 Still, 
while a breath test result is not conclusive regarding a defendant’s guilt, 
it forms a presumption that a defendant may overcome by relevant 
evidence.162 The Court’s opinion focused on the issue of “when” the per 
se level must be proved, not on whether the test itself is an element of 
the offense.163 Conrad did not solve everything, however—the Alaska 
courts continued to say that some states made the test result itself an 
element of the criminal offense.164 
In 2008, the idea that a test result was an element of the offense was 
explicitly rejected by Morris v. Department of Administration, Division of 
Motor Vehicles,165 which noted: “The offense [of DUI] is committed when 
either the blood alcohol level or the breath alcohol level is at or above .08 
percent.”166 
Morris was arrested and the Datamaster breath sample registered 
.089.167 Morris requested a blood sample be drawn which was drawn 
thirty-seven minutes after the breath test.168 The blood test result was 
.070.169 Morris was apparently never criminally prosecuted, but the 
Department of Motor Vehicles revoked his license anyway.170 Morris 
argued at his administrative proceeding that his .070 blood sample 
proved that his previous breath test result must have been erroneous.171 
The hearing officer ruled that the .070 blood sample did not prove that 
the .089 result was inaccurate and thus ruled that the state had proved 
intoxication by a preponderance of the evidence.172 
While the Supreme Court’s language in Morris at times used 
ambiguous descriptions of what the state had to prove, the overall 
discussion in Morris leaves no doubt that the state had to prove an actual 
 
 161.  Id. at 315. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 313 (“[W]e conclude that the statute requires proof of the 
defendant's blood alcohol level at the time the defendant operated or controlled a 
motor vehicle.”) (emphasis added). 
 164.  See id. at 315 n.7 (discussing other states’ statutes and their 
interpretations of the test result, not the alcohol concentration at the time of 
operating the vehicle). 
 165.  186 P.3d 575 (Alaska 2008). 
 166.  Id. at 581. 
 167.  Id. at 576. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 578. 
 172.  See id. (“The department counters that substantial evidence supports the 
hearing officer's determination that the breath test result was valid, that the 
blood test result does not prove that the Datamaster breath test was unreliable or 
inaccurate, and that Morris's blood test actually supports the hearing officer's 
finding that Morris's blood alcohol content was over the legal limit.”). 
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breath alcohol level and not just prove that there was a test result. First, 
the Court reiterated the requirements of due process, stressing the 
defendant’s ability to challenge an initial breath test result with an 
additional test.173 If the State only had to prove that Morris had a test 
result above .080, his other test result would have been completely 
irrelevant. But the Court explicitly stated that the result was relevant, 
concluding that “[w]hile an independent blood test result may have 
significant bearing on the weight afforded a breath test’s reliability in a 
given case, Morris has failed to provide sufficient support for his 
proposition that in this case the hearing officer’s finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence.”174 Indeed, the Court relied on the 
blood test to conclude that Morris’s actual blood alcohol level was above 
.080.175 
The reasoning of the decision leaves no doubt that the trier of fact is 
free to reject a breath test’s apparent result if the trier of fact believes the 
result is not accurate. Indeed, the Court noted that “the weight given to 
the breath test is a factual matter properly left to the hearing officer.”176 
It stands to reason that the trier of fact in a criminal case has at least the 
same discretion as the hearing officer. 
In 2009, the Alaska Supreme Court returned to the issue of 
challenging breath test results in Valentine v. State.177 Some of the 
formulations in Valentine suggest that the test result is the element of the 
offense,178 but when examined carefully it is clear that the Court did not 
mean the decision to be read that way.179 
 
 173.  See id. at 577–78 (“[W]hile [ALASKA STAT. § ]  28.35.033 creates a 
presumption of the chemical test’s validity . . . [a] driver has the right to 
challenge the accuracy of a breath alcohol test, which includes the right to obtain 
evidence of an independent blood test producing an exculpatory result.”). 
 174.  Id. at 582. 
 175.  See id. (“Specifically, had the hearing officer assumed the accuracy of the 
.070 percent blood test at 5:13 a.m., and extrapolated backwards in time using 
the average rate of alcohol elimination of .018 percent per hour, Morris’s level of 
intoxication would have been .081 percent at 4:36 a.m., the time of his chemical 
breath test. Thus, his blood test result supports the conclusion that Morris was in 
excess of the legal limit at the time of his breath test. . . .”). 
 176.  Id. at 581. 
 177.  215 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2009). 
 178.  See, e.g., id. at 323 (“Now, a person violates subsection (a)(2) if the person 
takes a chemical test within four hours of operating or driving a motor vehicle 
that yields a result of a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher, regardless 
of the person's blood alcohol at the time of driving.”). 
 179.  See, e.g., id. at 323–24 (“But in amending subsection (a)(2)'s blood-
alcohol-level theory of the DUI offense, the legislature did not revise subsection 
(a)(1)'s under-the-influence theory, which makes it a DUI offense to drive or 
operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or controlled 
substances.”) (emphasis added). 
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After being arrested, Valentine submitted to a breath test, “which 
showed a blood alcohol level of 0.099 percent” and a later blood test 
which “showed a blood alcohol level of 0.119 percent.”180 Interestingly, 
it was not specified in a general verdict whether Valentine was 
convicted under the blood-alcohol-level theory, the under-the-influence 
theory, or both.181 The trial court refused to permit Valentine to present 
evidence of consumption of alcohol before operating or driving because 
since Conrad, the legislature had amended the statute to forbid the 
introduction of such evidence.182 Thus, the trial court ultimately ruled 
that the statute plainly forbade the introduction of such evidence under 
either the blood-alcohol-level theory or the under-the-influence 
theory.183 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that insofar as the state 
relied on the under-the-influence theory, due process required that 
Valentine be permitted to present evidence that he was not under the 
influence because he had not yet absorbed the alcohol into his system.184 
The Court explained that “the legislature amended subsection (a)(2) to 
redefine the blood-alcohol-level theory of the DUI offense in terms of a 
defendant’s blood alcohol at the time that the defendant took a properly 
administered chemical test rather than at the time of driving.”185 But the 
Court also noted that the under-the-influence theory had not changed 
and that theory required the State to prove the driver was actually 
intoxicated at the time of driving.186 Accordingly, delayed absorption 
evidence was relevant to show that the defendant was not intoxicated.187 
 
 180.  Id. at 321. 
 181.  Id. at 320. 
 182.  See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(s) (2012) (“In a prosecution under (a) of this 
section . . . the consumption of alcohol before operating or driving may not be 
used as a defense that the chemical test did not measure the blood alcohol at the 
time of the operating or driving.”). 
 183.  Valentine, 215 P.3d at 321 (“The effect of the district court's ruling was to 
prohibit Valentine from offering evidence to show that even though his blood 
alcohol level was above the legal limit at the time of his two chemical tests, he 
was not guilty of driving while under the influence under either theory because 
at the time he drove the alcohol he had consumed had not yet been fully 
absorbed into his bloodstream.”). 
 184.  See id. at 321 (“[D]efendants are denied due process if they are barred 
from presenting delayed-absorption evidence in prosecutions relying on 
chemical test results to prove that they are guilty of a DUI offense under 
subsection (a)(1)'s under-the-influence theory.”). 
 185.  Id. at 323. 
 186.  See id. at 323–24 (“But in amending subsection (a)(2)'s blood-alcohol-
level theory of the DUI offense, the legislature did not revise subsection (a)(1)'s 
under-the-influence theory . . . .”). 
 187.  See id. at 324–25 (“But the delayed-absorption defense is still relevant to 
prosecutions under subsection (a)(1). A defendant's guilt in a DUI prosecution 
under this subsection turns on whether the defendant was ‘under the influence’ 
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Additionally, the court of appeals’ decision (which was overturned 
with respect to this one issue) noted the provision in the law that 
“defendants may introduce evidence of how much alcohol they 
consumed before driving to rebut or explain the results of the chemical 
test—for instance, a defendant may offer evidence that he only had two 
drinks before driving, and that the chemical test therefore must have 
been inaccurate . . . . “188 The court of appeals went on to explain that the 
statute did not create a conclusive presumption.189 
Because this was not an issue the Supreme Court needed to 
address, the Supreme Court did not do so, and this part of the court of 
appeals’ decision was not overruled. The court of appeals’ decision is 
clear that the courts were not reverting to the test itself as an element of 
the offense.190 
In September 2012 the Court of Appeals in McCarthy v. State191 
unambiguously stated that Defendants have a broad right to present 
evidence impeaching the accuracy of breath test results: 
McCarthy was free to present admissible evidence impeaching 
the accuracy of the breath test. He could have called the 
 
while operating or driving a motor vehicle. If the government offers evidence of 
the result of a properly administered chemical test after the defendant was 
stopped, this evidence does not directly prove that the defendant was impaired 
while driving because the chemical test result shows the percentage of alcohol in 
the defendant's bloodstream at the time that the test was administered.”). 
 188.  Valentine v. State, 155 P.3d 331, 338 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
 189.  See id. at 344 (“Under subsection (a)(2), it does not matter how 
intoxicated the motorist was at the time of driving. What matters is whether the 
motorist ingested enough alcohol before or while driving to have a blood alcohol 
level at or above .08 percent at the time of a chemical test administered within four 
hours of driving. The defendant may attack the accuracy of the chemical test, or show 
that alcohol was consumed after driving. What he cannot offer is evidence to 
show that the test did not measure his blood alcohol level at the time of driving 
because the alcohol he consumed before or while driving had not been fully 
absorbed—evidence that is no longer relevant under the amended statutes.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 190.  This is further illustrated by Judge Mannheimer’s partial dissent in the 
Court of Appeals, which the Supreme Court embraced in its decision. As Judge 
Mannheimer concluded, the prohibition in subsection (s) on delayed-absorption 
evidence in prosecutions under subsection (a)(1) that rely on chemical test 
results “unjustifiably prevents defendants from introducing evidence that is 
both scientifically valid and directly relevant to the question of whether the 
defendant was impaired by alcohol at the time of driving.” Valentine, 215 P.3d at 
327. The dissenting opinion explained that “now, a person violates subsection 
(a)(2) if they operate a motor vehicle and if, within four hours of their operation 
of the vehicle, their blood alcohol level is .08 percent or higher, and if this blood 
alcohol level is attributable to the person's voluntary consumption of alcoholic 
beverages either before or during their operation of the vehicle.” Valentine, 155 
P.3d at 349. 
 191.  285 P.3d 285 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012). 
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authors of the calibration reports, or any other witness, to 
explore the issue of the Datamaster’s accuracy. But that 
evidence would go to the weight of the breath test result, not its 
admissibility.192 
The discussion of the issue in McCarthy seems to leave no doubt 
that the breath test result is evidence of the offense and the defendant is 
free to challenge the reliability of that evidence, and the jury is free to 
weigh the value of the test evidence and reject it as inaccurate. 
The Court went on to address the “working tolerance” issue, 
although its ultimate resolution of the issue left open a lot of questions. 
One of the issues raised by McCarthy was that the particular Datamaster 
machine that tested his breath had consistently tested high by .004 to 
.008, compared to the control sample.193 McCarthy argued that this 
showed the instrument was unreliable so his apparent breath test result 
of .214 percent was not reliable.194 
The Court rejected this argument for a few reasons. First, the Court 
made reference to the “working tolerance” statute explaining: 
Under AS 28.90.020, a breath test result from a properly 
calibrated instrument is not affected by the instrument’s testing 
variations, as long as those variations are within the machine’s 
working tolerance. In other words, the fact that the breath test 
result may be higher or lower than the actual alcohol content of 
the suspect’s blood is irrelevant so long as the machine is 
functioning within the legally prescribed working tolerance.195 
The above paragraph cited no authority and did not explain why 
the “actual alcohol content of the suspect’s blood is irrelevant.” The 
court appears to have been paraphrasing Mangiapane without citation, in 
holding that evidence of an instrument consistently testing high was 
irrelevant.196 But if the actual alcohol content of the suspect’s blood is 
irrelevant, then why was McCarthy “free to present admissible evidence 
impeaching the accuracy of the breath test,” presumably by showing 
that his actual alcohol level was lower than the test result indicated? 
The Court then went on to give an alternative basis for its holding, 
raising yet more questions, explaining: 
 
 192.  Id. at 290. 
 193.  Id. at 287. 
 194.  Id. at 292. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  See Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchorage, 974 P.2d 427, 430 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1999) (“The fact that the driver’s true blood-alcohol or breath-alcohol 
level may be slightly lower (due to the Intoximeter’s acknowledged margin of 
error) is no longer relevant to the driver's guilt under AS 28.35.030(a)(2).”)  
Mangiapane was not cited anywhere in McCarthy. 
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The Datamaster’s calibration tests yielded only slight variations 
from the norm: test results that were between .004-.008 percent 
higher than the target values of the samples being tested. 
McCarthy’s test result was .214 percent. Even if McCarthy’s 
Datamaster was consistently high by as much as .008 percent, 
McCarthy’s blood alcohol content would still have been 
significantly over the legal limit (.08 percent).197 
Clearly, in McCarthy’s case his subject sample was so high that an 
instrument calibrated high by .008 would not have brought him within 
the legal limit. But what about a defendant in the same circumstances 
whose test result was .084, rather than .214? The Court’s opinion 
implicitly acknowledges that in some cases a Datamaster that was high 
by .008 percent would suggest that the person’s blood or breath alcohol 
content is actually below the legal limit. Was the Court suggesting that a 
defendant with a test result of .080 could present evidence that the 
instrument “was consistently high by as much as .008 percent.”? 
McCarthy gives no clear answer. On the one hand it affirms that a 
defendant may impeach the accuracy of the breath test and “explore the 
issue of the Datamaster’s accuracy,” while on the other hand asserting 
that “the actual alcohol content of the suspect’s blood is irrelevant.” 
The Court gave yet a third reason for rejecting McCarthy’s 
argument, namely, inadequate briefing.198 This inadequate briefing is 
likely one reason that the opinion seems to contradict itself in places.199  
Moreover, McCarthy does not appear to have argued on appeal that the 
working tolerance statute was unconstitutional, so the Court did not 
address this issue. 
To summarize McCarthy, and the current state of the Alaska 
precedent, a test result is the evidence by which the state proves breath 
alcohol content, and the breath test evidence may be challenged by any 
other evidence—except evidence of the instrument’s margin of error. 
Accordingly, looking at the whole gambit of decisions, it is clear 
that the central premise of Mangiapane, that the test result is an element 
of the criminal offense, has been rejected. So where does that leave us? Is 
Haynes, which held that the margin of error must be applied in favor of a 
 
 197.  McCarthy, 285 P.3d at 293. 
 198.  Id. at 293. 
 199.  Finally, it should be noted that the Court in McCarty conflates margin of 
error with a calibration adjustment. A margin of error is a random deviation 
plus or minus the true value. The facts in McCarty state that the instrument 
consistently tested .004 to .008 above the target value. If an instrument 
consistently tests .004 to .008 above the known target value it can be concluded 
that it is calibrated approximately .006 too high, with a random deviation of plus 
or minus .002. 
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criminal defendant still good law? It would seem so. Mangiapane held 
that Haynes had been superseded by statute, but since Mangiapane itself 
has been repudiated, Haynes must be binding precedent.200 
Setting aside whether the Haynes requirement that the margin of 
error must be applied in favor of a defendant, it is very hard to imagine 
a justification for not permitting a defendant to introduce such evidence. 
Clearly it is relevant evidence, at least when the apparent breath sample 
is at or near the legal limit. Given the Alaska Supreme Court’s repeated 
emphasis on the due process right to challenge the accuracy of a breath 
test how can a court prevent a defendant from contesting the accuracy of 
a test with relevant, exculpatory evidence? As in Valentine where the 
Supreme Court held that forbidding introduction of delayed absorption 
evidence violated a defendant’s due process right to present a defense, 
the “working tolerance” statute appears to do the same thing as the 
delayed absorption statute. 
VII. THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
In Taylor v. Illinois,201 the Supreme Court asserted that “[f]ew rights 
are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his 
own defense. Indeed, this right is an essential attribute of the adversary 
system itself.”202 At other times, however, the Court has emphasized the 
power of the government to exclude evidence. The Court in Taylor went 
on to note that “[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer 
testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible 
under standard rules of evidence.”203 And in 2006, the Court explained: 
“‘[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the 
Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal 
trials.’”204 While the characterization of the right may have varied, the 
Supreme Court is generally suspicious of any legislative attempts to 
limit the admissibility of relevant evidence. The discretion of legislatures 
 
 200.  Haynes clearly remains good law with respect to the “under the 
influence” theory. ALASKA STAT. 28.90.020 purports to make margin of error 
inadmissible under the “per se theory.” But what happens if the test result is 
below .08, say .075? Suppose further that the state wants to submit evidence of 
the apparent sample, along with other evidence, to argue that the person was 
actually intoxicated. Because ALASKA STAT. 28.90.020 only applies to the per se 
theory, it seems that a defendant must be permitted under Haynes to argue that 
the margin of error should be assumed in his favor. 
 201.  484 U.S. 400 (1988) 
 202.  Id. at 408 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). 
 203.  Id. at 410. 
 204.  Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting United 
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (additional internal citations omitted)). 
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in this area, the Court explains in Holmes, “has limits.”205 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never explicitly set out a 
general rule to apply in all exculpatory evidence cases. Edward 
Imwinkelried reads the bulk of Supreme Court cases as effectively 
relying on a balancing test considering four factors: (1) “the availability 
of alternative, admissible evidence”; (2) the reliability of the evidence, 
(3) the probative value of the evidence, and (4) the importance of the 
evidence to the defense.206 
There are also a variety of specific limitations on a defendant’s 
ability to present evidence. As the Court explained in Holmes: 
While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense 
evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that 
are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to 
promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges 
to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by 
certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or potential to mislead the jury. Plainly referring to rules 
of this type, we have stated that the Constitution permits 
judges “to exclude evidence that is ‘repetitive . . ., only 
marginally relevant’ or poses an undue risk of ‘harassment, 
prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues.’”207 
The first section of this article essentially considered the question of 
relevancy. If, as discussed above, the state must prove that the DUI 
defendant actually had a blood or breath alcohol level above a certain 
point, then evidence calling into question the accuracy of the result is 
relevant as it raises a doubt about the actual breath alcohol level. 
The most common reason for excluding relevant evidence is when 
it is unreliable. As one leading scholar in this area has put it: “The 
accused in a criminal proceeding has a constitutional right to introduce 
any favorable evidence, unless the state can demonstrate that it is so 
inherently unreliable as to leave the trier of fact no rational basis for 
evaluating its truth.”208 For example, the hearsay rules are intended to 
exclude unreliable information. But even with hearsay, the Supreme 
Court has held that due process takes precedence.209 
The priority of due process concerns over evidentiary concerns 
 
 205.  Id. at 324. 
 206.  IMWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 4, at 54. 
 207.  Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326. 
 208.  Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. R. 71, 151–52 
(1974–1975). 
 209.  See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (holding that state 
evidentiary rules cannot deprive criminal defendants of due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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with unreliability is especially important with respect to evidence that is 
acquired or certified through scientific or quasi-scientific means. 
Suppose, for example, a witness had no recollection of an event but 
allegedly was able to recover memories under hypnosis. Courts have 
struggled with whether such “recovered memory” is admissible, or 
whether the witness even has “personal knowledge.” 
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Rock v. Arkansas.210 The 
Court noted a variety of problems with hypnotically induced memory, 
noting that it frequently resulted in erroneous memories.211 The problem 
in Rock, however, was that Arkansas had a per se rule forbidding all 
testimony based on hypnotically recovered memory, and the witness 
who wished to testify was the defendant himself.212 Thus the 
defendant’s constitutional right to testify in his own defense was limited 
by the statute. In holding that Rock’s constitutional right to present 
evidence had been violated, the Court explained: 
A State’s legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does 
not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an 
individual case. Wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant’s 
testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to testify in the 
absence of clear evidence by the State repudiating the validity 
of all post-hypnosis recollections.213 
So while courts can exclude evidence which is unreliable, especially 
pseudo-scientific evidence, Rock suggests that a defendant cannot be 
prohibited from offering this evidence as a per se rule, but must be given 
an opportunity to establish the reliability of the proffered evidence.214 
More recently, in United States v. Scheffer,215 the Supreme Court 
considered “whether Military Rule of Evidence 707, which makes 
polygraph evidence inadmissible in court-martial proceedings, 
unconstitutionally abridges the right of accused members of the military 
to present a defense.”216 The Court considered various reasons why 
polygraph evidence might be excluded as unreliable, but ultimately 
determined that exclusion was permissible because it did not preclude 
the defendant from introducing direct factual evidence about the 
 
 210.  483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
 211.  Id. at 59–60. 
 212.  See id. at 49–50. 
 213.  Id. at 62. 
 214. Id. See also Patrick v. State, 750 S.W.2d 391 (1988) (holding that a statutory 
prohibition on admission of portable breath test results could not prevent 
defendant from using those results to help prove his innocence). 
 215.  523 U.S. 303 (1998). 
 216.  Id. at 305. 
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offense.217 The defendant was prevented only from introducing expert 
testimony to bolster his credibility.218 
These cases suggest that Alaska’s “working tolerance” statute 
might not survive constitutional scrutiny because it categorically 
excludes factual evidence bearing directly on the offense. Is it plausible 
to defend the “working tolerance” statute by claiming that it excludes 
only speculative evidence? Arguably speculation about inaccurate breath 
testing is not reliable enough to allow into evidence. For example, a 
breath sample of .080 is equally likely to be too high and too low.219 This 
places the fact-finder in the position of speculating, under the influence 
of both prosecutor and defense counsel, as to the actual percentage. 
This is one of the strongest arguments in favor of not admitting the 
evidence; but while this argument may have force in a civil case, it has 
much less force in a criminal case. In a civil case, where the burden of 
proof is a preponderance of the evidence, it is acceptable to claim that a 
test with a reasonable margin of error does not prevent the fact-finder 
from rendering judgment with the appropriate level of certainty. But 
when the burden is on the state to prove intoxication beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the fact that a breath test might register high or low of 
the actual mark places the ultimate issue in doubt. Moreover, prior to 
Mangiapane, at least, the Alaska Courts regarded a known margin of 
error as so well established as to be capable of judicial notice.220  Courts 
to have addressed the margin of error seem to regard the fact that 
breathalyzers have some margin of error as beyond dispute.221 Of 
course, with reference to particular models of breathalyzer which do not 
have a well-known or recognized margin of error, the court might 
require a party to present evidence as to what the margin of error is.222 
There are also limits to the admissibility of exculpatory evidence placed 
 
 217.  See id. at 318. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  This hypothetical assumes there is no other evidence of the amount of 
alcohol consumed. And in some cases there may be evidence that the particular 
machine is consistently registering high or low. 
 220.  In Haynes the Court simply declared (without citation) that “[t]he 
Intoximeter 3000 has a recognized margin of error of .01 grams per 210 liters of 
breath.”  865 P. 2d 753,  754 (1993).  See also Bushnell v. State, 5 P.3d 889, 891 
(2000) (“[T]he Intoximeter’s working tolerance (or margin of error) of .01 percent 
is likewise well-known”). Even Mangiapane referred to “the Intoximeter’s 
acknowledged margin of error.” 974 P.2d 427,  430 (1999). 
 221.  See Haynes, 865 P.2d at 755, and the cases cited there. The cases cited in 
Haynes do not dispute whether there is a margin of error but only the legal 
significance of this fact. 
 222.  See, e.g., Borger v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 192 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1121–22 
(2011) (holding that an expert’s “bald” assertion that the Intoxilyzer 5000 had a 
margin of error of +/- .020 did not overcome the rebuttable presumption present 
in a civil case that a test result of 0.08 percent or more establishes intoxication). 
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on defendants by rules of procedure. For example, Taylor v. Illinois ruled 
that a defendant could not present certain witnesses when defense 
counsel refused to comply with discovery rules, explaining that 
“[d]iscovery, like cross-examination, minimizes the risk that a judgment 
will be predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately 
fabricated testimony.”223 For example, the Court noted that it was not a 
violation of due process to refuse to permit expert testimony when the 
defense refused to provide the prosecution with a copy of the expert’s 
report.224 While Taylor thus permits the exclusion of certain exculpatory 
evidence based on procedural violations, this holding affords no 
protection for the form of exclusion at work in the Alaska “working 
tolerance” statute. This case is noted because it again shows that the 
right to present exculpatory evidence is not absolute. It also could come 
into play in a DUI case, if, for example, the defense attempted to call an 
expert witness without proper notice. The statute is not designed to 
impose a procedural requirement. It is more like the per se exclusionary 
rule deemed unconstitutional in Rock.225 
The existence of a privilege or confidential information is another 
potential basis for excluding relevant evidence, but the Alaska Supreme 
Court has been hesitant to allow the prosecution to exclude evidence on 
the basis of confidentiality.226 
Courts have frequently found a violation of a defendant’s right to 
due process or to confront witnesses when a state has restricted a 
defendant’s ability to present evidence to the jury based on a state 
privilege. In Davis v. Alaska,227 Davis wished to impeach a witness with 
evidence of the witness’s juvenile conviction and probationary status.228 
However, the trial court did not permit this line of questioning because 
of a state law protecting the secrecy of juvenile convictions.229 The U.S. 
Supreme Court, while acknowledging an important state interest in 
maintaining the secrecy of juvenile records, held that restricting 
defendant’s counsel from pursuing this line of questioning violated 
Davis’s Sixth Amendment right to cross examination and a fair trial.230 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie231 also involved a dispute over the extent to 
which a state could classify certain information as privileged and refuse 
 
 223.  Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1988). 
 224.  Id. at 412 (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975)). 
 225.  See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987). 
 226.  See ALASKA R. EVID. 501 (limiting the privilege to refuse testimony only 
to a limited number of explicitly enumerated cases). 
 227.  415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
 228.  Id. at 309. 
 229.  Id. at 311–12. 
 230.  Id. at 320. 
 231.  480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
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to disclose it to the defense.232 Ritchie was charged with sexual abuse of 
his daughter who had been interviewed by state social workers a 
number of times.233 These social worker files were classified as 
privileged under state law and the state refused to provide copies to the 
defense even though the defense believed they might contain 
exculpatory information.234 Again the Court stated that “the public 
interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong,” but 
held that the need for evidence in a criminal case outweighed this 
interest.235 
Confidentiality is relevant in the DUI context as well. There has 
been an ongoing battle in many jurisdictions over whether the 
prosecution must reveal the source code for breathalyzers to defense 
counsel. This would enable defense counsel to have an expert analyze 
the code and attack how the instruments calculate their results.236 
Manufacturers have insisted that the source code is proprietary and 
cannot be revealed.237 
Putting that thorny issue aside, however, the argument that the 
margin of error is confidential is dubious. Given that the Supreme Court 
has held that even clearly confidential information such as the criminal 
records of minors must give way to the defense right to present 
evidence, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would be willing to 
permit the state to conceal the margin of error on state breath testing 
instruments.238 This argument does not appear to have ever been raised, 
however, so courts have not decided the issue. 
In conclusion, while there are a variety of exceptions which permit 
courts to exclude relevant exculpatory evidence, those exceptions have 
been narrowly drawn, and it is difficult to fit the “working tolerance” 
 
 232.  Id. at 43–44. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. at 44. 
 235.  Id. at 57. The Court did note that there were some limits to this access, 
however, and decreed that the trial court should perform an in camera review of 
the material, preventing the defense from having complete, unfiltered access to 
the materials. Id. at 60. 
 236.  For a helpful overview of this issue, see Aurora J. Wilson, Note, Discovery 
of Breathalyzer Source Code in DUI Prosecutions, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 121 
(2011). 
 237.  See, e.g., State v. Kuhl, 741 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he 
record is clear that the source code is not in the State’s possession and that the 
manufacturer of the machine in question considers the source code to be a trade 
secret and the proprietary information of the company.”). 
 238.  One other theory that should perhaps be mentioned is that relevant 
evidence can be excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by undue prejudice. ALASKA R. EVID. 403. I have not seen this issue raised in any 
DUI cases, and it is hard to imagine how evidence of margin of error could be 
unduly prejudicial. 
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statute into any of those exceptions. 
VIII. IS THERE A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO HAVE A MARGIN OF 
ERROR APPLIED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS?  
The above sections have focused on whether a defendant has a 
right to introduce evidence of the margin of error or uncertainties in the 
testing procedure. This last section will address whether due process 
requires that any margin of error be assumed in her favor. 
The standard argument that the margin of error must be applied in 
a defendant’s favor is that a reading within an acknowledged margin of 
error is enough as a matter of law to create reasonable doubt regarding 
whether the defendant was above the legal level. This argument gets 
stronger the closer to the legally required percentage that a subject 
sample is.239 This argument is based purely in the presumption of 
innocence and the requirement that the state prove intoxication level 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
There is a second argument that a conviction cannot be based on a 
“purely fortuitous” result. In Best v. Municipality of Anchorage,240 the 
Court of Appeals noted that the test results were so suspect that 
conviction was based on the “purely fortuitous” result finding that the 
MPT and Intoximeter results just happened to be close to each other.241 
This argument has not been explored further in Alaska, however.242 
Nonetheless, it can hardly be doubted that the right to be free from 
arbitrary enforcement of the criminal law is even more important than 
the right to vote. The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the fundamental 
principle, stating that “[t]he due process guarantee protects citizens 
from the arbitrary or fundamentally unfair use of government 
power.”243 After all, whether an individual’s vote is counted is extremely 
unlikely to have any effect on that individual, whereas the arbitrary 
enforcement of criminal law may mean the difference between going 
free or going to jail. 
 
 239.  A subject sample at .080 has essentially a 50/50 chance that the next 
sample will be above or below .080. As the number of subject samples increases, 
the odds of one of those tests registering above the legal limit also increase. 
 240.  712 P.2d 892 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 241.  Id. at 896. 
 242.  The United States Supreme Court took up essentially the same issue in 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), which turned on whether there were sufficient 
safeguards to ensure uniformity of vote counting, and held that due process 
guarantees citizens the right to be free from arbitrary and disparate treatment in 
the exercise of the fundamental right. Id. at 105. 
 243. Municipality of Anchorage v. Ray, 854 P.2d 740, 748 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1993) (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 664 (2d ed. 1988)). 
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Like the famous dimpled chads of Bush v. Gore,244 conviction and 
incarceration in DUI cases where the defendant is close to the legal limit 
depends on some degree of randomness. A person who blows into a 
Datamaster and obtains a result of .080 might well have blown into the 
machine a minute later and obtained a .079 result. Moreover, 
Datamaster machines are only required to be calibrated to within an 
acceptable working tolerance, which is plus or minus .010 of the known 
test value.245 Datamaster machines also experience drift. So even if all of 
the machines are initially calibrated perfectly, they may lose accuracy 
over time. This means that a person blowing into several Datamaster 
devices will have different results. A person blowing into two different 
instruments one after the other could get subject samples differing by as 
much as .020 based simply on instruments being calibrated 
differently.246 
This means that a person can be guilty of a crime if she blows into 
one machine but not another. The difference between .079 and .080 is 
entirely the result of a random fluctuations in 1) the machine’s margin of 
error, 2) the differing breath samples of individuals, and 3) the 
calibration of the particular machine. Any one of these three factors 
could cause deviations away from the true measurement. When all three 
are taken together they can result in large variations in test results 
(typically assumed to be +/- .020).247  Thus relying on one simple test is 
effectively random and arbitrary, because there is no certainty that the 
single sample is accurate. Obviously, the closer one gets to the legal limit 
the less confidence one can have in the result, but even apparent test 
results well over the limit may still be the result of random fluctuations. 
Most states have adopted a rule requiring duplicate tests to help prevent 
the introduction of a random fluctuation. Conviction on a test result 
close to the limit, especially within the acknowledged margin of error is 
the criminal equivalent of a person’s freedom depending on the 
 
 244.  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 245.  Bushnell held that calibration to within plus or minus .010 is “tolerably 
inaccurate.” 5 P.3d 889, 891 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000). 
 246.  McCarthy v. State, 285 P.3d 285, 288 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012), held that an 
instrument that consistently tested .008 higher than the target value of the 
control sample was “within the acceptable margin of error set by law.”  One 
machine could be calibrated .008 high and another .008 low, so a person with an 
actual breath alcohol level of .080 would have a result of .088 in the first device 
and .072 in the other.  Thus a defendant’s guilt or innocence could turn on the 
purely fortuitous choice to blow into one instrument or the other. 
 247.  See State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Minn. App. Ct. 2012) (showing 
sample readings of .131, .132, .119 and .121 and noting that this “variation in the 
reading is common and expected”); see also infra at n. 269–94 (noting the number 
of states that require two or more tests to be within .020). 
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interpretation of a hanging chad.248 
The only United States Supreme Court case directly to address the 
due process concerns for breath alcohol testing was California v. 
Trombetta249 in 1984. Trombetta argued that due process required that 
the state preserve a breath sample for later testing, as a later test might 
well be able to call into doubt the initial test results.250 The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument, noting that the procedures used by 
California—two independent measurements closely correlated and 
bracketed by blank tests—were sufficient to guarantee due process.251 
While the Court did not explicitly say that one test would be insufficient 
to guarantee due process, the Court’s emphasis on the process used in 
the particular case (that is, two independent measurements which must 
be closely correlated) at least suggests that two tests might be a 
requirement of due process.252 
As a general matter, the Supreme Court requires a balancing of 
state and private interests to determine if the procedures used to deprive 
a person of liberty or property are constitutionally adequate. As the 
Court explained in Matthews v. Eldridge:253 
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific 
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three 
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and, finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
 
 248.  This argument is different than the claim that a single test is so uncertain 
as to be inadmissible under the rules of evidence. This latter argument was 
rejected in State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn. 1977). Dille had an 
apparent blood sample of .226 and argued on simple admissibility grounds “that 
it was insufficient to make only one analysis of defendant’s blood sample 
because of the chance of error in any single test.” Id. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court rejected the argument, explaining that the single test displayed sufficient 
indicia of reliability to make it a candidate for jury consideration. See id. 
Although it might be a preferred practice to run duplicate tests, the failure to do 
so in this case was not a sufficient reason to exclude the test results. The 
argument from Bush v. Gore is not about admissibility; it is that the admissible 
evidence resulting from a single test within the known margin of error is 
insufficient to support a conviction. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 249.  467 U.S. 479 (1984). 
 250.  Id. at 481. 
 251.  Id. at 489. 
 252.  See id. 
 253.  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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entail.254 
This general due process requirement is an additional argument in 
favor of a duplicate testing. The risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty 
when a person’s first breath test is at or just over the legal limit is 
substantial. Even when the test result is well above the limit there is still 
a possibility that the test result is an anomaly. Thus the probative value 
of additional testing is significant. In contrast, the additional cost to the 
state in having a subject tested twice—typically a five-minute process—
is negligible.255 
The Colorado Supreme Court relied on this cost-benefit analysis to 
hold that due process required either a second test or preservation of a 
sample for independent testing.256 In 1979, Colorado had a regulation 
much like Alaska’s which permitted a defendant to request a duplicate 
blood test, but did not require a second test.257 However, the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that this was insufficient to guarantee due process 
and held that a suspect “must be given a separate sample of his breath at 
the time of the test or the alcoholic content of his breath [must be 
preserved] in a manner which will permit scientifically reliable 
independent testing by the defendant.”258 The Court noted how 
important a duplicate test could be for the defendant and stated that 
“the cost of preserving and testing a separate sample of a defendant’s 
breath is between three and four dollars.”259 
The principal obstacle to adopting this line of reasoning into Alaska 
law is the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Gunderson v. Municipality 
of Anchorage.260 There, the Alaska Supreme Court did not engage in 
cost/benefit analysis but held that if no breath sample is preserved, 
“due process requires that [police] give clear and express notice of a 
defendant’s right to an independent test and offer assistance in 
obtaining one in order to introduce police-administered test results at 
 
 254.  Id. at 334–35. 
 255.  Garcia v. Dist. Court 21st Judicial Dist., 589 P.2d 924, 929 n.3 (Colo. 1979) 
(estimating the additional of preserving an additional breath sample to be three 
to four dollars) implicitly overruled on other grounds by California v. Trombetta, 
467 U.S. 479 (1984).  The Datamaster used by the State of Alaska already has the 
capacity to do duplicate breath testing simply by selecting “Number of Tests” on 
the menu and entering “2.”  BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING MANUAL, supra note 47, at 
16. 
 256.  Garcia, 589 P.2d at 929 n.3 (citing both the Colorado and U.S. 
Constitutions). 
 257.  Id. at 926. 
 258.  Id. at 930. 
 259.  Id. at 929 n.3. 
 260.  Gunderson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673, 677 (Alaska 
1990). 
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trial.”261 
Gunderson is open to several criticisms. First, Gunderson relied on 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Trombetta when it stated that “the 
chances are extremely low that preserved samples would have been 
exculpatory” and “the high accuracy of the Intoxilyzer would mean that 
a preserved breath sample would simply confirm the original test 
result.”262 Yet the Alaska Supreme Court failed to note that this finding 
was based on the specific procedure at issue in Trombetta, i.e., using two 
independent breath tests within an acceptable range of each other.263 
The second criticism of the opinion is that offered by Justice Burke 
in his dissent to the Gunderson opinion.264 The majority noted that while 
defendants had a right to an independent test, that right could be 
waived if the police offered them the possibility of a second test.265 But 
as Justice Burke pointed out, a waiver is a knowing and voluntary 
relinquishment of a right.266 It is difficult to see a decision as a fully-
informed waiver when it is made in a split second, by a person in a 
police station, who has been drinking, is tired, scared, in handcuffs, 
knows nothing about alcohol testing, has had no chance to consult with 
counsel, and may suspect that police are trying to trick him.267 
There are several other reasons why Gunderson should be 
reconsidered. First, the history of offering independent tests seems to 
support the dissent’s case—although there are no published figures on 
what percentage of suspects requests an independent test, the vast 
majority end up waiving their rights.268 The fact that so few suspects 
request a test suggests that suspects do not know what to make of it. 
Another issue to keep in mind is that Gunderson was decided in 
1990, before the enactment of the “working tolerance” statute. When 
Gunderson was decided, any known margin of error had to be applied in 
favor of the defendant. When the working tolerance is being credited to 
the defendant the need for a second test is less important. But when the 
margin of error is not applied in favor of the defendant, and the 
 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id. at 675 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 491 (1984)). 
 263.  Gunderson, 792 P.2d at 675. 
 264.  Id. at 678–79. (Burke, J., dissenting). 
 265.  Id. at 677 (“[W]e do not believe that having to make a choice while in 
police custody so diminishes the value of the notice of the right to an 
independent test that it makes it an unreasonable opportunity to challenge the 
accuracy of the Intoximeter test result.”). 
 266.  Id. at 678 (Burke, J., dissenting). 
 267.  Id. at 678-79 (Burke, J., dissenting). 
 268.  In my own estimate, having handled more than one hundred DUI cases, 
I would guess the percentage of defendants who request an independent test is 
less than 10%. 
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defendant is within the acknowledged margin of error, then a second 
test is vital to an accurate determination of the breath alcohol level. 
A third issue to consider is that a majority of states now require 
multiple breath tests, and generally use the lower of the two tests. States 
requiring two tests include Alabama,269 Arizona,270 California,271 
Connecticut,272 Florida,273 Georgia,274 Idaho,275 Maine,276 Maryland,277 
Massachusetts,278 Michigan,279 Nevada,280 New Mexico,281 North 
Carolina,282 North Dakota,283 Oklahoma,284 Pennsylvania,285 Rhode 
 
 269.  McDaniel v. State, 706 So.2d 1305, 1307 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (noting 
that Alabama Administrative Code at Rule 370-1-1-.01(4)(a) provides that “Two 
(2) samples of breath shall be tested. . . . Report the lower test result.”) 
 270.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1323(A)(3) (requiring duplicate breath 
tests within .020 alcohol concentration of each other). 
 271.  See People v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (Cal. 2002) (noting 
requirement for two tests within .02); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 1221.4 (2013). 
 272.  See REGS. CONN. STATE AGENCIES. § 14-227a-8b(c) (2013) (“Each time a 
sample is analyzed by a device or instrument other than a direct breath alcohol 
testing device or instrument, the analyst shall analyze duplicate samples.”). 
 273.  See FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 11D-8.002(12) (2013) (requiring “a minimum of 
two samples of breath collected within 15 minutes of each other, analyzed using 
an approved breath test instrument, producing two results within 0.020 
g/210L”). 
 274.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-392(a)(1)(B) (2012) (providing that “two 
sequential breath samples shall be requested for the testing” and “the readings 
shall not differ from each other by an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.020 
grams and the lower of the two results shall be determinative for accusation and 
indictment purposes and administrative license suspension purposes”). 
 275.  Idaho procedure provides for two breath samples taken two minutes 
apart and within .02 of each other.  See IDAHO STATE POLICE, Idaho Standard 
Operating Procedure, Breath Alcohol Testing, § 6.2 (Jan. 16, 2013) available at 
http://isp.idaho.gov (prescribing multiple tests). 
 276.  See State v. Kennedy, 657 A.2d 773, 774 (Maine 1995) (“[R]egulations 
provide in part that a complete blood-alcohol test must consist of two separate 
breath samples, the results of which are within .02% of each other . . . .”). 
 277.  See Lowry v. State, 768 A.2d 688, 691 (Md. 2001) (“[A] test actually 
consists of two breath samples in order to compare the samples to ensure that 
the instrument is in proper working order.”). 
 278.  See 501 CODE MASS. REGS. § 2.14 (2013) (requiring two breath samples 
within +/- .020 of each other). The regulation further provides that “the lower of 
the two breath sample results shall be truncated to two decimal places and 
reported as the arrestee’s BAC.” Id. 
 279.  See People v. Dinardo, 801 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (noting 
collection of two breath samples is standard procedure). 
 280.  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 484C.200 (2011) (requiring two tests within .020 of 
each other). 
 281.  See N.M. CODE R. § 7.33.2.15(B)(2) (2011) (requiring a good faith effort to 
collect at least two breath samples). 
 282.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20–139.1(b3) (2011) (requiring testing of duplicate, 
sequential samples). 
 283.  See Koenig v. N.D. Dep’t of Trans., 696 N.W.2d 534, 535 (N.D. 2005) 
(noting the requirement for duplicate breath samples). 
 284.  See Childs v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 988 P.2d 898, 899 (Okla. 1999) 
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Island,286 Texas,287 Washington,288 and Wisconsin.289  New Jersey and 
Minnesota have gone so far as to require four separate and independent 
breath test results.290 Other states have administered multiple breath 
tests: Arkansas,291 Mississippi,292 New York,293 and Wyoming.294 While 
many states have adopted these measures by statute or regulation, the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court recently held that due process required 
the state to collect and preserve a second breath sample when the state 
collects a single breath sample.295 
Vermont has a provision that a suspect must be offered a second 
breath test and may “elect to have a second [breath] test administered 
immediately after receiving the results of the first test.”296 In State v. 
Lowe,297 the defendant’s first sample registered .083 and the second 
registered .079.  A second breath test may be more valuable to a 
defendant than a blood test; for example, if a suspect’s blood test 
registers .070 thirty minutes later, the trier of fact might conclude that 
the difference is due to elimination of alcohol and still find the 
 
(“In accordance with the Board’s regulations, a suspect driver's breath is tested 
twice within a short period.”). 
 285.  See 67 PA. CODE § 77.24(b) (2012) (requiring two breath samples within 
.020). 
 286.  See State v. Ensey, 881 A.2d 81, 85 (R.I. 2005) (describing the “two phase” 
process by which two breath samples are collected). 
 287.   See Texas Breath Alcohol Testing Program Manual, 52–53 (Randall 
Beatty & Mac Cowen eds., 2001), available at www.txdps.state.tx.us/ 
CrimeLaboratory/documents/BATOperatorManual.pdf (providing for 
duplicate testing); TEXAS TRANSPORTATION CODE §  724.012(a) (providing that an 
arresting officer may require a suspect to submit “one or more” breath samples). 
 288.  WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.506(4)(a)(vi) (2012). 
 289.  WISC. ADMIN. CODE § TRANS 311.06(3)(d) (requiring “[c]onsecutive breath 
alcohol analysis results in a test sequence within .02”). 
 290.  State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 131 (N.J. 2008); State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 
679,  681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). 
 291.  See Hayden v. State, 286 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (noting 
two tests). 
 292.  See Parkman v. State, No. 2011-KM-00723-COA, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 
364, at *3 (Miss. Ct. App. June 19, 2012) (noting defendant submitted two 
samples two minutes apart with the lower of the two used for prosecution). 
 293.  People v. Mertz, 497 N.E.2d 657, 658 (N.Y. 1986).  In New York some 
localities appear to use duplicate testing. 
 294.  See Peterson v. Wydot, 158 P.3d 706, 708 (Wyo. 2007) (noting the 
defendant took two tests); Hwang v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 247 P.3d 861, 863 
(Wyo. 2011) (noting two tests). 
 295.   In re Opinion of Justices (Eliminating Requirement for Additional 
Breath Samples), 2 A.3d 1102, 1105 (N.H. 2010). See also Ex parte Mayo, 652 So.2d 
201, 205–06 (Ala. 1994) (holding that due process required the state to adopt 
measures ensuring the accuracy of testing and stating that “administering two 
breath tests” was one possible way of accomplishing that goal). 
 296.  23 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1202(d)(5) (2012). 
 297.  740 A.2d 348, 350 (Vt. 1999). 
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defendant guilty. 
Multiple test results were less common twenty years ago when 
Gunderson was decided,298 but the prevalence of multiple testing around 
the country and the widespread recognition that this is a more accurate 
method argues that double testing has become a de facto due process 
protection in a wide variety of jurisdictions. Numerous experts and 
safety organizations, such as the National Safety Council, have called for 
duplicate testing to ensure accuracy.299 
The final change calling for a reconsideration of Gunderson is the 
Bush v. Gore case, discussed above. As superseding precedent calls 
Gunderson into doubt, the Court should consider the “working 
tolerance” statute in light of Bush v. Gore.300 
CONCLUSION 
Given the fundamental right to introduce exculpatory evidence, 
Alaska’s “working tolerance” statute is hard to justify and is outside the 
mainstream. The issue of whether due process requires that the margin 
of error be applied in favor of a defendant is a closer call. Given the 
older Alaska precedents which held that this was a requirement of due 
process, and given the decision in Bush v. Gore,301 there is a strong 
argument that this margin must be assumed to benefit the defendant. 
What is certain is that the Alaska courts have made a confusing tangle 
out of this issue since Mangiapane. The Alaska Supreme Court has stated 
that statutes restricting defendants’ right to present a defense must be 
“closely scrutinized.”302 It is past time the Supreme Court reexamined 
this issue and clarified the right to present exculpatory evidence in DUI 
cases. 
Finally, while this article has been phrased chiefly in terms of the 
defendant’s right to present exculpatory evidence, a second breath test 
may give the prosecution a stronger case. A person with an initial test 
result of say, .081, may give a second result beneath .080, thus 
potentially avoiding convicting an innocent person. But the second 
 
 298.  While some states such as California have long had duplicate tests, one 
treatise from 1995 indicates that duplicate testing was the exception in the early 
1990s. EDWARD L. FIANDACH, HANDLING DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 13.20 (2nd ed. 
1995) (“[A]ctual breath tests are rarely given in duplicate . . . .”). 
 299.  See id. (“The National Safety Council has endorsed the practice, writing, 
‘The test result reported in the case of breath analysis should be the mean of the 
results of at least two separately collected breath specimens providing the 
results agree with 10 percent of the mean value.’”). 
 300.  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 609 (Alaska 2007). 
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result may give an even higher result, in which case the state will have a 
much stronger case.303 A second test may be exculpatory or it may be 
inculpatory, but in either case the jury will have better information upon 
which to base a verdict, the defendant can be afforded due process, and 
the adversarial system can be confident in a just result. 
 
 
 303.  Jeanne Swartz, former head of Alaska’s Breath Alcohol Testing Program, 
wrote in 2004: “Many states require defendants to provide two breath samples 
within 0.020 of each other. It is very unlikely that an instrument would record 
two samples within 0.020 or each other if the operator or instrument conducted 
the test properly.” JEANE SWARTZ, BREATH TESTING FOR PROSECUTORS, 14 (APRI, 
2004) available at http//www.ndaa.org/pdf/breath_testing_for_prosecutors.pdf. 
 
